The first major issue in Diamond is whether Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), establishes a Sixth Amendment bar to the introduction of a co-conspirator’s statement in furtherance of the conspiracy. No, holds ACCA. United States v. Diamond, __ M.J. ___, No. ARMY 20010761, slip op. at 14-18 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 21, 2007). ACCA holds that this issue continues to be governed by United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). ACCA also cites three circuits’ rulings that “co-conspirator statements admitted pursuant to Federal Rule fo Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) . . . are ‘generally [nontestimonial] and, therefore, do not violate the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court.” Id., slip op. at 17 (quoting United States v. Singh, 494 F.3d 653, 658 (8th Cir. 2007) (alternation in the original)). ACCA also quotes the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that “Crawford did not change the rules as to the admissibility of co-conspirator statements.” Id., slip op. at 17 (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 419 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005)).