A crucial part of Festivus is the airing of grievances. It seems that the Acting SG has been saving up some of his grievances toward CAAF. At the end of a hard-hitting cert petition that largely adopts and presents Judge Ryan’s dissent from Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2008), the Acting SG concludes by airing some of his pre-Denedo grievances:
The decision below represents the latest iteration of that court’s efforts to expand its role beyond its congressionally prescribed jurisdiction to “review * * * specified sentences imposed by courts-martial.” Goldsmith, 526 U.S. at 534; see, e.g., United States v. Lopez de Victoria, 66 M.J. 67 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (permitting appeals to the CAAF from the decisions of the Courts of Criminal Appeals in interlocutory appeals by the government); United States v. Tamez, 63 M.J. 201 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (permitting extension, for “good cause,” of the statutory deadline for filing appeals to the CAAF); Loving v. United States, 62 M.J. 235 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (asserting jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to entertain petitions for habeas corpus after there is a final judgment); Kreutzer v. United States, 60 M.J. 453 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (employing All Writs Act to regulate defendant’s place of confinement); Goldsmith v. Clinton, 48 M.J. 84 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (employing All Writs Act to enjoin the government from administratively discharging Air Force Officer), rev’d, 526 U.S. 529 (1999). This Court’s intervention is warranted, once again, in order to confine the CAAF to its statutory jurisdiction.