The Supremes today denied cert in Pendergrass v. Indiana, No. 09-866, as announced on this Order List.  The Court also denied cert in the military pro se IFP case of Taylor v. United States, No. 09-10418.

2 Responses to “Cert denied in Pendergrass”

  1. Dew_Process says:

    It seems a little bit odd that they didn’t grant cert and then just “park” Pendergrass until they decided Bryant, on a related confrontation clause issue. But, Bryant doesn’t involve “surrogates” and so still wouldn’t really resolve that issue, even though it may further refine the concept of “testimonial.”

    But, as ususal, it’s best not to read anything into the cert. denial, because as someone [I think Phil Cave] said here recently, it’s purely speculative.

    But, it does make you wonder what was in the letter that was submitted to the Court…..

  2. Phil Cave says:

    Here’s my stock quote (probably a little dated).

    [D]enial of a petition for writ of certiorari . . . simply means that fewer than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision of the lower court as a matter “of sound judicial discretion.” A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may lead different Justices to the same result.. . . Inasmuch, therefore, all that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court’s views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review. The Court has said this again and again; again and again the admonition has to be repeated. United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482 (1923). See also, Evans and Jordan v. Stephens, et. al., 544 U.S. 942, n.1 (2005)(“Nothing is more basic to the functioning of this Court than an understanding that denial of certiorari is occasioned by a variety of reasons which precludes the implication that were the case here the merits would go against the petitioner”); and see, Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice, 7th ed., para. 5.7.