This week at SCOTUS: The Supreme Court denied the petition in Ali v. United States, No. 12-805. Behenna is scheduled for conference on May 30, 2013. I’m not aware of any other military justice developments at the Supreme Court. There is just one military justice case pending SCOTUS action:

This week at CAAF: The next scheduled oral argument at CAAF is on June 11, 2013.

This week at the ACCA: The Army CCA will hear oral argument in one case this week, on Wednesday, May 22, 2013:

United States v. Marino, No. 20120107

Issue: [Whether t]he charge is invalid under the preemption doctrine of the Uniform Code of Military Justice because it prohibits the charging of General Article 134 when the appropriate charge is the enumerated offense of article 92.

Note: A friend informs me that this case involves a soldier in Germany who pleaded guilty to two specifications of wrongful possession of child pornography in violation of Article 134 (prior to the President’s enumeration of that offense). But there is also a local general order prohibiting possession of such materials. The Appellant argues that the existence of the order preempts the application of Art. 134 to his misconduct.

This week at the AFCCA: The Air Force CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

This week at the CGCCA: The Coast Guard Trial Docket shows no pending cases at the Coast Guard CCA.

This week at the NMCCA: The Navy-Marine Corps CCA will hear oral argument in one case this week, on Wednesday, May 22, 2013:

United States v. Paris

Case Summary:
A panel of members with enlisted representation, sitting as a special court-martial, convicted the appellant, contrary to his plea, of attempting to access, with the intent to view, child pornography in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934. The members sentenced the appellant to reduction to the pay grade E-1 and a bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged, and except for the punitive discharge, ordered it executed.

I. Whether the appellant’s entry of terms into a search engine was a “substantial step” toward the commission of the offense.
II. Whether the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had the specific intent to access websites containing child pornography.

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