Many seek congressional intent in the statutory language of Article 120 (2006). The Army CCA found it:
we must first consider whether Congress has expressed its intent regarding convictions for both indecent liberties with a child and indecent exposure when the offenses arise from the same criminal act. The very statutory language of Article 120, UCMJ, evinces a congressional intent that a singular indecent exposure to one person should result in but one conviction. If the victim was an adult at the time of the exposure, then the crime committed was indecent exposure. See UCMJ art. 120(n). On the other hand, if the victim was a child, then the crime committed was indecent liberties with a child. See UCMJ, art. 120(j).
United States v. St. John, 72 M.J. 685, No. 20110779, slip op. at 5 (A.Ct.Crim.App. Jun. 24, 2013) (citation omitted) (link to slip op.). The court finds that Appellant’s convictions, in accordance with his pleas, to indecent exposure and indecent liberties with a child, are facially duplicative. Of course, it undoubtedly helped that “[t]he government concedes that these specifications are facially duplicative and one must be set aside.” Slip op. at 1. The court also notes that however you might want to count the misconduct in this case, “the accused stands convicted twice for a singular criminal exposure to one person.” Slip op. at 5. But, in case there’s any lingering doubt, the court also finds that “as charged here, indecent exposure is a lesser-included offense of indecent liberties with a child.” Slip op. at 5.