Over 120 years ago, in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (JUSTIA) the Supreme Court explained that the Founders created the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination as a “protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons which has long obtained in the continental system.” Specifically, the Court noted:
[The Fifth Amendment was created to protect an accused from] the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials . . . [which] made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.
Id. at 597.
Seventy years later, the Supreme Court found that the Fifth Amendment’s purpose – abolishing “inquisitorial” police practices – had yet to be satisfied. Accordingly, the Court issued its decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (oyez).
Miranda put in place a procedure for police to use when conducting interrogations. But those procedures were a means to an end, not an end unto themselves. Miranda was supposed to change policing culture. Its rules were supposed to address “what in fact goes on in [police] interrogation rooms,” and to eradicate the “inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 683, 687.
As CAAF has explained:
The Miranda rules were issued to counter-balance the psychological ploys used by police officials to obtain confessions.
United States v. Leiker, 37 M.J. 418, 420 (CMA 1993); United States v. Sojfer, 47 M.J. 425, 429, n. 18 (CAAF 1998).
In an article soon to be published by the Texas Tech Law Review entitled Fifty Years Later: Miranda and the Police, 50 Tex. Tech L.R. ____ (2018), Professor Tracy Hresko Pearl argues that Miranda has failed to help the Fifth Amendment achieve the “total abolition” of inquisitorial police interrogation that Brown v. Walker says the Founders intended. Instead:
Rather than abandoning the psychologically coercive tactics about which the [Miranda] Court expressed concern in its decision, the police have continued to utilize them and to do so often and in combination.
On the flip side, Miranda has done very little to change the behavior of suspects. . . . The only suspects that Miranda appears to have made more savvy are those with prior felony convictions. . . .
Perhaps most troubling, however, is the way in which Miranda allows police officers to sanitize confessions and incriminating statements. Simply providing Miranda warnings and obtaining a waiver from suspects virtually guarantees that anything they say subsequently will be admissible in court, barring only the most extreme situations. Far from reducing the coercive atmosphere in interrogation rooms, Miranda has actually protected if from judicial scrutiny, and provided greater protection for police practices which might otherwise be challenged successfully by defendants in criminal cases.
Fifty Years Later at 18-19.
In sum, Professor Pearl concludes:
Miranda has been far more beneficial than detrimental to the police in the United States,  its protections have been largely meaningless or unclaimed by all but the most experienced criminals, and , consequently, it has hampered the pursuit of justice as a whole.
Id. at 2.