CAAFlog » Court-Martial News

In 2009 then-Private First Class Bergdahl walked away from his combat outpost in Patika Province, Afghanistan. He was captured by the Taliban and held for nearly five years. He was recovered in a May 2014 trade for five Guantanamo Bay detainees that a report by the House Armed Services Committee found violated several laws. Ten months later, in March of 2015, now-Sergeant Bergdahl (who was promoted while in captivity as if he were a prisoner of war) was charged with desertion and misbehavior offenses, his case was referred for trial by general court-martial, and last week Bergdahl elected to be tried by a court-martial composed of a military judge alone.

As the case progressed some wondered why Bergdahl is being prosecuted after nearly five years of captivity in the hands of insurgents. The facts of his capture are relatively undisputed; in a moment of severe naivete (or maybe narcissism) Bergdahl walked away from his combat outpost and into the Afghan wilderness. The subsequent half-decade of maltreatment he suffered is undoubtedly a harsh price to pay for his terrible decision. Nevertheless – and despite the recommendation of the Article 32 preliminary hearing officer that Bergdahl face a lesser, special court-martial not authorized to adjudge a punitive discharge – Bergdahl will soon be tried by a general court-martial where he faces the possibility of a dishonorable discharge and confinement for as long as life without the possibility of parole.

Bergdahl’s decision to be tried by a military judge alone rather than a panel of members came after a year of litigation about comments made by President Trump during the campaign (as well as comments by others) that Bergdahl’s defense counsel claimed make it impossible for Bergdahl to receive a fair trial. A judge-alone trial likely waives that issue, and almost certainly cures it. It’s a surprising gift to the prosecution in a case with seemingly-overwhelming evidence, including that Bergdahl probably confessed to the desertion offense, and his post-recovery statements to film producer Mark Boal are probably a confession to the misbehavior offense as well.

One possible rationale for the decision to elect trial by a military judge alone is that a military judge will give Bergdahl credit for his time in captivity, at least by considering that time as a significant mitigating factor. This, of course, assumes that Bergdahl is guilty. But assuming that he is guilty of the desertion and misbehavior (or either) offenses that led to his capture, it’s not at all clear that his captivity mitigates his misconduct. Rather, I think there’s a stronger argument that Bergdahl’s captivity is a matter in aggravation.

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After so many motions, writ-petitions, and breathless claims that Army Sergeant Bergdahl can’t get a fair trial by court-martial on the charges of desertion with the intent to shirk important service and avoid hazardous duty in violation of Article 85(a)(2) and misbehavior before the enemy in violation of Article 99 for leaving his combat outpost in Patika Province, Afghanistan (leading to his capture by the Taliban and captivity for nearly five years), Bergdahl has elected to be tried by a court-martial composed of a military judge alone:
(source).

Here is Washington Post coverage (alternate link) of an $8.5 million jury award in a defamation case brought by retired Army Col. David Riggins against Susan Shannon who, in 2013, alleged that Riggins raped her in 1986 when they were both cadets at the United States Military Academy (West Point). The allegation was investigated by Army CID, and Riggins was subsequently removed from the promotion list for brigadier general.

After Shannon made her claim, Riggins told investigators that he had a consensual sexual relationship with her while at the Academy but he denied assaulting her:

The CID also contacted Riggins. A report in court records shows that Riggins described a consensual sexual encounter with Shannon after a Halloween party in 1983, and a short relationship with an amicable breakup. Riggins said he had no significant contact with her in 1986. In Washington state, Shannon told investigators there was no sex or relationship in 1983, only a rape after Riggins saw her staggering out of a pedestrian tunnel on campus in the spring of 1986. She claimed Riggins offered her a ride in his car, and that she had no memory of the actual assault, although she said Riggins “smugly admitted he did indeed rape” Shannon, according to a Fairfax court filing.

Riggins sued Shannon in Virginia, asserting:

that every aspect of her rape claim on the West Point campus was “provably false,” and that she wrote two blog posts and a Facebook post “to intentionally derail [his] promotion” to brigadier general. During a six-day trial that ended Aug. 1, a jury in Fairfax County, Va., heard from both Riggins and Shannon at length. And after 2½ hours of deliberation, they sided emphatically with Riggins, awarding him $8.4 million in damages, an extraordinary amount for a defamation case between two private citizens. The jury ordered Shannon to pay $3.4 million in compensatory damages for injury to his reputation and lost wages, and $5 million in punitive damages, “to make sure nothing like this will ever happen again,” according to one of the jurors.

A juror told the Post:

“Honestly,” said juror Marshall Reinsdorf, “we thought who was telling the truth was too obvious to be discussing. We held a vote, and everybody believed the colonel. The only argument was how big the damages were going to be.” Of the four women and three men on the jury, two other jurors declined to comment, two jurors did not return messages and two could not be reached.

Army Staff Sergeant (SSG) Robert Bales pleaded guilty at a general court-martial in 2013 to the murder of 16 Afghan civilians in 2012. The case had been referred capital, and his plea avoided the possibility of the death sentence. Bales received the maximum possible sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

In 2015, GQ magazine published this story about Bales based largely on post-conviction interviews of Bales that, according to the story, Bales hopes “will humanize him, and he hopes that one day in the hard-to-imagine future, as the wars fade from memory, someone will deem his sentence to be excessive, take mercy on him, and grant him a measure of clemency.”

The Army CCA will hear oral argument in Bales appeal tomorrow. Two issues are before the court:

I. [Whether Bales] is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because of the Government’s Brady violation, the Government’s fraud on the court-martial and the military judge’s exclusion of Mullah Baraan’s ties to IED evidence.

II. [Whether] the military judge erred by failing to hold a Kastigar hearing to determine the extent the military judge’s mistaken disclosure of Fifth Amendment protected information affected the sentencing hearing.

Both of these issues look to be wholly focused on Bales’ sentence, and neither appear to challenge his plea. The second issue probably involves the military judge’s erroneous disclosure of an unredacted copy of Bales’ R.C.M. 706 (sanity board) evaluation to the prosecution (noted here).

The first issue may also include a challenge to the safety of the widely-used anti-malaria drug mefloquine. According to this Seattle Times report published last week:

Defense attorneys are expected to argue that while on a 2003-2004 tour in Iraq, and possibly in Afghanistan in 2012, Bales took the antimalarial drug mefloquine, according to John Henry Browne, a Seattle attorney who has assisted in the soldier’s defense.

In July 2013, the FDA issued its strictest warning about mefloquine, noting the potential for long-term neurological damage and serious psychiatric side effects. The defense team did not raise Bales’ possible use of the drug during sentencing proceedings the next month.

Defense attorneys now hope the drug issue can persuade a three-judge panel to lessen his sentence.

In a series of posts (here, here, and here) in May and June we discussed the case of Senior Chief Barry, U.S. Navy, who was convicted of one specification of sexual assault in violation of Article 120, and sentenced to confinement for three years and a dishonorable discharge. The convening authority – Rear Admiral Patrick J. Lorge (now retired) – approved the findings and sentence, the NMCCA affirmed in an opinion available here, and CAAF summarily affirmed on April 27, 2017. But after CAAF acted, the Admiral signed an affidavit alleging that he really wanted to disapprove the finding of guilty but the then-Judge Advocate General of the Navy and her deputy (the current JAG) persuaded him not to do so because it would be bad public relations for the Navy and hurt Lorge’s career.

That allegation prompted CAAF to reverse its summary affirmation and grant review of “whether senior civilian and military leaders exerted unlawful command influence on the convening authority.” CAAF also ordered post-trial fact-finding.

That fact-finding is underway. According to this report published by the San Diego Union-TribuneVice Admiral Crawford (the current JAG) gave a deposition this week and, according to Barry’s civilian defense counsel, “Crawford has confirmed that he discussed the case with Lorge. Crawford also disclosed the existence of documents and messages exchanged at the highest levels of the Navy about Barry.”

But the report also raises a new allegation: that Vice Adm. Crawford pushed for a prosecution in a different case involving the 2016 drowning death of a special operations candidate, Seaman James Derek Lovelace. Barry was also a member of the special operations community, but was not (best I can tell) involved in any way in the death of Lovelace.

The Union-Tribute reports that:

Word that the Union-Tribune had received records in both the Barry and Lovelace cases triggered numerous, sometimes frantic, calls from top Navy officials nationwide on Monday and Tuesday, with flag officers or their representatives inquiring into Crawford’s involvement in both matters.

It’s certainly not unusual for a JAG or other senior military attorneys to get involved in serious cases, to form opinions about whether prosecution is warranted, and to take action consistent with their opinions. Article 34, in fact, requires them to do precisely that. The emerging claim from the Barry and Lovelace cases, however, seems to be that Vice Adm. Crawford has – and acts on – a pro-prosecution bias.

Paradoxically, at the end of the Union-Tribune article that claim is offered as a justification to give lawyers more power in the military justice system:

Eugene R. Fidell, the military law instructor at Yale Law School, said both cases possibly linked to Crawford were very unusual but pointed out the need for broader reforms to the way the armed forces dispense justice.

“These cases illustrate that Congress needs to get serious about the military justice system and turn it from an 18th century system into one fit for the 21st century,” said Fidell. “Military decisions on who gets prosecuted, and for what, are based on a system that was used by King George III. Until that changes, you’ll continue to see controversies like these.”

Fidell has long advocated for lawmakers to strip commanders of the power to decide who is prosecuted, to pick jurors and to vacate verdicts and sentences, vesting charging authority instead with senior attorneys independent of the chain of command and jury selection with an outside and impartial commissioner.

In this post I noted a May 12, 2017, news report about the case of Senior Chief Barry, U.S. Navy, who was convicted of one specification of sexual assault in violation of Article 120, and sentenced to confinement for three years and a dishonorable discharge. Mike posted a follow-up here.

The convening authority – Rear Admiral Patrick J. Lorge (now retired) – approved the findings and sentence, and the NMCCA affirmed in an opinion available here. CAAF summarily affirmed on April 27, 2017.

After CAAF acted, the Admiral signed an affidavit alleging that he wanted to disapprove the finding of guilty but the then-Judge Advocate General of the Navy and her deputy (the current JAG) persuaded him not to exonerate the sailor because it would be bad public relations for the Navy and hurt Lorge’s career.

Yesterday – in an order available here – CAAF vacated its decision and ordered a factfinding hearing:

That the petition for reconsideration is granted; this Court’s order of April 27, 2017, is vacated; and the petition for grant of review is granted on the following issue:

WHETHER SENIOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS EXERTED UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE ON THE CONVENING AUTHORITY.

In addition, the motion to appoint a special master is denied; the motions to supplement the record are granted; the motion for oral argument is denied; and the motion to remand for new post-trial processing is denied.

The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy for remand to a convening authority other than the one who convened the court-martial concerned and one who is at a higher echelon of command. This convening authority shall order a factfinding hearing pursuant to DuBay. The presiding officer at this hearing shall be a military judge from an armed force other than the United States Navy or United States Marine Corps. See Rule for Court-Martial 503(b)(3). This military judge shall inquire fully and make findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the alleged unlawful command influence matter underlying the granted issue. At the conclusion of the DuBay hearing, the military judge will return the record directly to this Court for further review of the granted issue under Article 67, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2012).

One noteworthy part of CAAF’s order is that it does not permit disapproval of the conviction now if the DuBay were deemed impracticable. Absent such authorization, the conviction will stand unless CAAF finds a reason to reverse it. And the Admiral will testify if called (or face potentially-severe consequences), as he is still subject to the UCMJ.

Here is a copy of a letter dated April 26, 2017, in which the Commanding Officer, Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center, reported three false positive results for methamphetamine at the Navy Drug Screening Laboratory, Great Lakes (NDSL-GL):

On 13 April 2017. NDSL-GL discovered a specimen was incorrectly reported positive for methamphetamine on 11 April 2017. During confirmatory testing it was determined that the false positive specimen was co-processed with a batch rejected due to cross-contamination generated from a specimen that contained a very high methamphetamine concentration. As a result. a retest was conducted that revealed no evidence of methamphetamine in the service member’s urine. The positive report was withdrawn and the submitting command notified of the error.

Sadly, this wasn’t an isolated problem. An investigation revealed:

two additional contaminated specimens were identified: one was not reported as positive due to a subsequent negative intermediate screening result, and the second was reported on 7 June 2016 for an Army Reserve member. The reported result was discovered on 22 April 2017. The positive report was withdrawn and the submitting command and the Army Drug Testing Program Office were notified of the false positive report. The Service Member had not yet been separated.

Here is Navy Times coverage of the affidavit submitted by retired Rear Admiral  Patrick J. Lorg in the sexual assault case of Senior Chief Special Warfare Operator (SEAL) Keith Barry.  Here is Zach’s prior coverage from the Washington Times.  Here is a link to the NMCCA opinion in the case. 

In a story available here Rowan Scarborough reports for the Washington Times that:

Retired Rear Adm. Patrick J. Lorge charges in a May 5 signed affidavit that the then-judge advocate general of the Navy and her deputy tried to persuade him not to exonerate the sailor because it would be bad public relations for the Navy and hurt Mr. Lorge’s career.

. . .

Mr. Lorge said he came to believe that there was insufficient evidence to convict and wanted to overturn the verdict. His staff judge advocate advisers tried to talk him out of it. Failing, they then brought in the Navy’s powerhouse admirals to talk him out of it.

Vice Adm. Nanette DeRenzi, then judge advocate general of the Navy, talked to him in his office.

. . .

He then spoke by telephone with Vice Adm. James Crawford III, then Adm. DeRenzi’s deputy and the current judge advocate general of the Navy.

. . .

“Upon my review of the record of trial from this case, I did not find that the government proved the allegation against Senior Chief Barry beyond a reasonable doubt,” Mr. Lorge wrote. “Absent the pressures described above, I would have disapproved the findings in this case.”

The case is that of Senior Chief Barry, U.S. Navy, who was convicted of one specification of sexual assault in violation of Article 120, and sentenced to confinement for three years and a dishonorable discharge. Admiral Lorge approved the findings and sentence, and the NMCCA affirmed in an opinion available here. The CCA’s opinion included this detail:

In relevant part, the convening authority stated:

In my seven years as a General Court-Martial Convening Authority, I have never reviewed a case that has given me greater pause[.] The evidence presented at trial and the clemency submitted . . . was compelling and caused me concern as to whether SOCS Barry received a fair trial or an appropriate sentence. I encourage the Appellate Court to reconcile the apparent divergent case law addressing the testimony that an accused may present during sentencing for the purpose of reconsideration under R.C.M. 924. Additionally, having personally reviewed the record of trial, I am concerned that the judicial temperament of the Military Judge potentially calls into question the legality, fairness, and impartiality of this court-martial. The validity of the military justice system depends on the impartiality of military judges both in fact and in appearance. If prejudicial error was committed, I strongly encourage the Appellate Court to consider remanding this case for further proceedings or, in the alternative, disapproving the punitive discharge pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, thereby allowing the accused to retire in the rank that he last honorably served.

United States v. Barry, No. 201500064, slip op. at 6-7 n.14 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. October 31, 2016) (marks in original) (link to slip op.).

CAAF issued this order on Friday:

No. 17-0307/AR. Robert B. Bergdahl v. Jeffrey R. Nance and United States. CCA 20170114. No. 17-0307/AR. Robert B. Bergdahl, Appellant v. Jeffrey R. Nance, Colonel, J.A. Military Judge, and United States, Appellees. CCA 20170114. On consideration of the writ-appeal petition and the motion of Former Federal Judges to file an amicus brief, it is ordered that said motion is hereby denied, and that said writ-appeal petition is hereby denied.

This was Bergdahl’s seventh writ petition, and it sought dismissal of his case because of things said during the presidential campaign (last discussed here).

Bergdahl’s prior trips to Judiciary Square were noted here (#6), here (#5), here (#4), here (#3), here (#2), and here (#1).

Here is the Fayetteville Observer’s coverage of today’s scheduled hearing on motions in the SGT Bowe Bergdahl case. In today’s motions “prosecutors in April asked for the declassification of seven documents they plan to use during the proceedings.” In case you don’t get out much, from the FayObs:

Bergdahl is charged with desertion and misbehavior before the enemy by endangering the safety of a command, unit or place. He could face life imprisonment if convicted of misbehavior before the enemy.

He walked off his remote post in Afghanistan in 2009 and was subsequently held by the Taliban for five years.

Bergdahl’s appeal remains pending at CAAF, Stars and Strupes coverage here.

Here is Navy Times coverage of LCDR Lin’s plea deal. In what was an espionage case — it now becomes something much less, per Navy Times:

The Navy has dropped espionage charges against Lt. Cmdr. Edward Lin, part of a plea bargain agreement with the government that will result in the accused spy pleading guilty to a slate of lesser charges. 

Lin, who initially faced more than 30 years in the brig for allegations of spying for Taiwan and other misconduct, will plead guilty to lesser charges of communicating defense information, as well as multiple counts of disobeying lawful orders for mishandling classified information, lying on his leave chits about his travel and not reporting foreign contacts. 

In an opinion piece published by the Alaska Dispatch News and available here, Professors Rachel VanLandingham and Joshua Kastenberg (both retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonels and former Air Force military judges) call for the complete dismissal of the charges against Sergeant Bergdahl (CAAFlog news page) because:

On the campaign trail, then-candidate Trump repeatedly, and publicly, condemned Bergdahl as a traitor, and variously called for his execution by firing squad and by being pushed out of an airplane. This was not a one-off event; candidate Trump made his conclusion that Bergdahl is a traitor and should be executed a campaign meme, returning over and over to the same rhetoric.

Trump has never disavowed these comments. While it is true he hasn’t repeated them in the few short months he’s been in office, that’s because he doesn’t have to -– he knows he has already sent a very loud, very clear and very powerful message to his military subordinates (many of whom voted for him) he wants Bergdahl convicted and given the harshest punishment possible.

They echo the oft-repeated claim of Bergdahl’s defense counsel that the President’s campaign-trail comments are unlawful command influence so severe that it can’t be remedied. That claim is the subject of a seventh petition for extraordinary relief currently pending before CAAF (noted here) (pleadings available here).

While Professors VanLandingham and Kastenberg argue that the continued prosecution of Bergdahl risks “the fairness, credibility and integrity of the military justice system,” I believe that the danger to military justice is in dismissal, not continued prosecution.

Dismissal would, as I explained here, result in Sergeant Bergdahl’s honorable discharge from the Army, and it would also guarantee him other benefits in connection with his alleged desertion (and subsequent capture by the Taliban); an offense that, as I explained here, it seems Bergdahl confessed to committing. Bergdahl also engaged in a dialogue with filmmaker Mark Boal that resulted in roughly 25 hours of tape, and Bergdahl allowed the Serial podcast to use those recordings (according to the Serial podcast; link to episode transcript). Those recordings contain more damaging admissions and other aggravating evidence (some discussion here), and their publication is likely far more damaging to Bergdahl than anything said on the campaign trail.

Dismissal is a remedy for unlawful command influence, but it’s the most extreme remedy and it means that Bergdahl could never receive a fair trial in the wake of Trump’s pre-election comments. Getting a fair trial may be harder than it would have been before the comments – or it could be easier if the court-martial members think the comments were inappropriate and hold them against the prosecution – but there’s no evidence that a fair trial is impossible.

Professors VanLandingham and Kastenberg also lash out at their Army colleagues:

Bergdahl’s defense has already tried to get this case dismissed on these grounds. However, not surprisingly, the military judge and Army appellate court (also consisting of active-duty military members) have declined to cross their commander-in-chief in that manner.

I think this is a foul blow. There’s absolutely no evidence that the military judge (Colonel Jeffrey Nance) or the multiple appellate military judges who have considered this issue are the slightest bit afraid to correct injustice when they see it. Rather – as I noted here in the context of comments by Senator McCain that Bergdahl also tried to use to win a dismissal – the reaction of Simpsons character Monty Burns to the Germans seems closer to the true feelings of Army trial and appellate military judges in the face of any kind of improper influence. VanLandingham and Kastenberg must have a remarkably dim view of the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps.

The credibility of the military justice system is founded in its systemic ability to do justice, not in the result of one particular (and factually and emotionally thorny) case. If those championing dismissal of the charges against Bergdahl really believe that the trial military judge and the Army CCA are incapable of remedying unlawful command influence committed by a presidential candidate who subsequently gets elected, then the damage to the military justice system is already done.

There is significant evidence that Bergdahl committed multiple offenses in departing and staying away from his combat outpost, and many of his fellow soldiers suffered as a result. That Bergdahl spent five years in captivity is a mitigating factor for sure, but it’s one that must be considered in context with the other facts of the case.

The appropriate place for that to occur in the first instance is neither the court of public opinion nor the appellate courtroom; it’s a court-martial.

The Marine Corps Times reports here about North Carolina charges filed against a career Marine accused of:

posting one nude photo of the woman and six pictures of her wearing underwear on April 14, according to an arrest warrant, which does not identify the website where the pictures appeared.

According to the report, the accused is charged with “felony disclosure of private images,” which appears to be a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-190.5A.(available here), which states:

(b) Offense. – A person is guilty of disclosure of private images if all of the following apply:

(1) The person knowingly discloses an image of another person with the intent to do either of the following:

a. Coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, or cause financial loss to the depicted person.

b. Cause others to coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, or cause financial loss to the depicted person.

(2) The depicted person is identifiable from the disclosed image itself or information offered in connection with the image.

(3) The depicted person’s intimate parts are exposed or the depicted person is engaged in sexual conduct in the disclosed image.

(4) The person discloses the image without the affirmative consent of the depicted person.

(5) The person discloses the image under circumstances such that the person knew or should have known that the depicted person had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The statute defines a reasonable expectation of privacy as:

When a depicted person has consented to the disclosure of an image within the context of a personal relationship and the depicted person reasonably believes that the disclosure will not go beyond that relationship.

§ 14-190.5A(a)(5).

The North Carolina statute seems to be perfectly adequate to criminalize the kind of bad acts at issue in the Marines United scandal, and the statute appears free of the flaws I identified in my analysis of the recently-promulgated Article 1168, U.S. Navy Regulations.

If Congress thinks there should be a similar statute of national applicability, perhaps it should enact one.

We haven’t covered it much, but the Marines United scandal involves a Facebook group by that name where personal information and explicit photographs of current and former female service members were posted (generally for the purpose of bullying and harassment). An early news report about the scandal is here. A SASC website on the scandal is here, and video of a March 14, 2017, SASC hearing is available here. The story continues to develop.

The latest development came Tuesday, with the promulgation of a new Navy Regulation intended to target photo sharing like that in the Marines United group. In ALNAV 021/17 the acting SECNAV creates Article 1168, U.S. Navy Regulations, violation of which is punishable under Article 92:

1. Pending formal amendment to reference (a), this interim change adds a new article, Article 1168 to reference (a). This interim change is effective upon the release of this ALNAV.

2. Article 1168 of reference (a) is added to read as follows:

a. 1168. Nonconsensual distribution or broadcasting of an image

(1) The wrongful distribution or broadcasting of an intimate image is prohibited.

(2) The distribution or broadcasting is wrongful if the person making the distribution or broadcast does so without legal justification or excuse, knows or reasonably should know that the depicted person did not consent to the disclosure, and the intimate image is distributed or broadcast:

(a) With the intent to realize personal gain;

(b) With the intent to humiliate, harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the depicted person; or

(c) With reckless disregard as to whether the depicted person would be humiliated, harmed, intimidated, threatened, or coerced.

3. Distribution means the act of delivering to the actual or constructive possession of another, including transmission by electronic means.

4. “Broadcasting” means the act of electronically transmitting a visual image with the intent that it be viewed by a person or persons.

5. An intimate image is any visual depiction, including by electronic means, that:

a. Includes another person who is identifiable from the depiction itself or from information conveyed in connection with the depiction;

b. Depicts that person engaging in sexually explicit conduct or depicts the private area of that person; and

c. Taken under circumstances in which the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

6. “Sexually explicit conduct” is defined in Part IV, paragraph 68b, Manual for Courts-Martial (2016 Edition).

7. “Private area” is defined in Part IV, paragraph 45c, Manual for Courts-Martial (2016 Edition).

8. In lieu of entering this interim change in reference (a), make a bold letter notation after Article 1167 of reference (a), SEE ALNAV 021/17 and file this ALNAV in front of reference (a).

9. This interim change will be incorporated into the next printed revision of reference (a).

10. Released by Sean J. Stackley, Acting Secretary of the Navy.

The new Navy Regulation 1168 suffers from three obvious flaws.

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