You will remember Padilla v. Kentucky, and you will remember United States v. Denedo, 66 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2008) – now you may have to remember Chaidez. Along with United States v. Miller, 63 M.J. 452 (C.A.A.F. 2006), the bottom line issue is what must a defense counsel tell an accused who intends to plea guilty at court-martial about collateral effects of the conviction.
To refresh. In United States v. Denedo, (and forgive me this one time), the LEXIS case summary is:
Appellant servicemember filed a petition for extraordinary relief with the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA), requesting collateral review of his court-martial for alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, and issuance of a writ of error coram nobis under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1651(a). The CCA denied the government’s motion to dismiss. It also denied the servicemember’s petition in summary fashion. He appealed.
The Government contended that the CCA erred by not dismissing the petition on jurisdictional grounds, while the servicemember contended that it erred by not granting relief. He challenged his court-martial conviction, asserting that his plea was not knowing or voluntary. He contended that he expressly requested guidance of counsel on the immigration impact of his plea, that the advice provided by his attorney was defective, and that he relied upon ineffective assistance of counsel to his detriment in pleading guilty. The question in the case was whether a court-martial conviction, imposed on a servicemember while in military status, was subject to collateral review under the All Writs Act by the court that approved the conviction. The court determined that the CCA did not err by reviewing the servicemember’s petition under the All Writs Act. It next considered next whether the petition met the criteria for issuance of a writ of error coram nobis. The writ petition met the threshold criteria for coram nobis review. However, until the government was required to respond on the merits, it would have been inappropriate for the court to render a judgment on the merits of his petition.
The court remanded the petition to the CCA for further proceedings, where the government would have the opportunity to obtain affidavits from defense counsel and submit such other matter as the CCA deemed pertinent. The CCA was then, inter alia, to determine whether the merits of the petition could be resolved on the basis of the written submissions, or whether a fact finding hearing was required under DuBay.
The Supremes granted a writ, and in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the CAAF. United States v. Denedo, 555 U.S. 1041 (2009). Upon remand the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals denied Denedo’s petition in an unpublished decision, United States v. Denedo, NMCCA 9900680, 2010 CCA LEXIS 27 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. March 18, 2010). Denedo’s appellate counsel filed a petition with CAAF, but it was dismissed as untimely. A motion for reconsideration of the denial was denied in a 3-2 decision, with Efron and Baker dissenting, United States v. Denedo, Misc. No. 10-8016/NA, 2010 CAAF LEXIS 795 (C.A.A.F. September 8, 2010).
At 0955 today on SCOTUSBlog live blog from the Supremes we see:
Tom: The most likely grant today (by far) is the Stanford Clinic’s petition in the Chaidez case on the retroactivity of the S. Ct.’s holding in Padilla that effective assistance of counsel includes giving correct advice about the immigration consequences of a plea agreement. It is very likely because the Solicitor General has agreed cert should be granted.
At 0956 we see:
Kali: Here’s the Chaidez case page: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/chaidez-v-united-states/
And of course Chaidez is listed as a grant in the orders list. Here is the link to Chaidez v. United States at SCOTUSBlog.
Issue: Whether the Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that criminal defendants receive ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment when their attorneys fail to advise them that pleading guilty to an offense will subject them to deportation, applies to persons whose convictions became final before its announcement.
Here is how Lyle Denniston characterizes Chaidez at SCOTUSBlog:
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to settle a dispute among lower courts on whether to give more immigrants the benefit of a ruling that requires their lawyers to advise them more clearly on what can happen if they plead guilty to a crime. At issue in the new case of Chaidez v. United States (11-820) is the potential retroactivity of the Court’s 2010 ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky. This was the only new case granted on Monday; it will be heard and decided in the new Term starting October 1.
In the Padilla decision, the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes a right for a non-citizen living in the U.S. to be advised by a lawyer of the consequences under immigration law of pleading guilty to a crime that could lead to deportation. The majority noted that, under dramatic changes recently in immigration law, deportation is virtually automatic after one is convicted of an ”aggravated felony.”
Certainly we may get more guidance about the scope of an pre-plea advice. That is still troublesome with Miller and other collateral effects issues. See e.g., United States v. Blume, ACM 37385, 2012 CCA LEXIS 98 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. March 23, 2012), United States v. Page, ACM 37612, 2011 CCA LEXIS 294 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. August 25, 2011), United States v. Rose, 67 M.J. 630 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2009).
Query, would a favorable retroactivity ruling in Chaidez also benefit former appellant’s who had a Miller issue, or is Chaidez limited to civilian cases of immigrants? If there were a bunch of Denedo-like cases out there I’d of expected them to show up by now.