As CAAFLog notes below, the new MCM Amendments seek to add an Art. 134 offense for various child pornography related offenses to alleviate the constitutional issues with proving images of child pornography are actual children. First, I’d like to say that it was nice to see the drafters considered the unintentional receipt issue–though the drafting reminds me of another provision by creating a burden shifting issue in requiring the defendant to disprove intentional possession.
But, more importantly, someone please tell me how the definitions of used in the underlying “child pornography” offenses in proposed paragraph 68b. aren’t hopelessly overbroad, namely variants b(1) (“Possessing, receiving, or viewing”) and b(4) (“Producing”)? Here are the relevant definitions (possession and production are offenses):
“Child Pornography” means any visual depiction of a minor, or what appears to be a minor, engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
“Possessing” means exercising control of something. Possession may be direct physical custody like holding an item in one’s hand, or it may be constructive, as in the case of a person who hides something in a locker or a car to which that person may return to retrieve it. Possession must be knowing and conscious. Possession inherently includes the power or authority to preclude control by others. It is possible for more than one person to possess an item simultaneously, as when several people share control over an item.
“Producing” means creating or manufacturing. As used in this paragraph, it refers to making child pornography that did not previously exist. It does not include reproducing or copying.
See 74 Fed. Reg. 47785, 47786 (strangely “viewing” is not defined). The First Amendment issue was exactly why the child pornography statute was drafted the way it was, i.e. to include only real minors. The problem of private possession of cartoons and the like was one of the main problems discussed in the original enactment, as even the Fourth Circuit recently acknowledged in U.S. v. Whorley. As the Fourth Circuit majority stated,
In [Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)] the Supreme Court held that a Georgia statute prohibiting the possession of obscene matter, even within the home, was incompatible with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 568. Finding the statute too broad, the Court explained that “traditional notions of individual liberty” and the paramount importance accorded in our society to the “privacy of a person’s own home” create a “right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of [one’s home] library.” Id. at 565. Thus, the government’s regulatory “power simply does not extend to mere possession [of obscene materials] by the individual in the privacy of his own home.” Id. at 568.
United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 569 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2009). The justification for the current PROTECT Act prohibition on cartoons and virtual child pornography is the use of interstate commerce to send and receive obscene material. See id. Not to mention the fact that the cartoon and virtual image provision itself has been found unconstitutional by at least one US District Court, U.S. v. Handley, 564 F. Supp.2d 996 (S.D. Iowa 2008), though admittedly that represents a minority view. However, notably the proposed paragraph does not explicitly require that the depictions be obscene, something that even the Fourth Circuit acknowledged was required to prohibit transmission in interstate commerce of cartoon images.
The paragraph could really use something of a re-write to get around these very problems that took Congress years to solve. A potential solution to the private possession issue might be a requirement that the depictions become public, something akin to Art. 88′s requirement that through “an act of the accused [the pictures] came to the knowledge of a person other than the accused.” And, addition of the word obscene somewhere in the definition wouldn’t take much work. As for the burden shifting issue, see U.S. v. Neal.