CAAFlog » Military Justice Scholarship

On Friday, administration officials posited the President may invoke the “tremendous power” of The Insurrection Act of 1807 (10 U.S.C. 252) in order to have federal troops enforce the Nation’s domestic immigration laws. Of course, this is not new – a small number of judge advocates have already been detailed to the Department of Justice since last summer, augmenting that agency as immigration prosecutors. That move was decried by some lawmakers as “unwise,” but the practice was not halted. But, the administration’s latest rhetorical volley has inspired fevered commentary across the political news spectrum. Into that fray comes a short thought-piece by Professor Steve Vladeck, of the University of Texas School of Law, which was just recently published in The Atlantic.

Professor Vladeck’s commentary posits:

[A]lthough Congress in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 generally prohibited use of the federal military for domestic law enforcement, the Insurrection Act was always understood as the principal exception to that general rule.

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As covered on this blog, on April 16, 2019, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued its decision on a petition for a writ of mandamus in the case of In re: Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Al-Nashiri. The Circuit Court granted Al-Nishiri’s request to vacate all orders issued after November 19, 2015 by the former Air Force Chief Trial Judge—now a civilian immigration judgeVance Spath. The reason for that action was that Judge Spath issued those orders while he had a “concealed and disqualifying ethical conflict.” Opinion at 15. The saga has now drawn the attention of major news outlets – Washington Post, New York Times, Bloomberg, Fox News.

Digging into the details, the Circuit Court found that Judge Spath engaged in undisclosed negotiations for future employment with the Attorney General while simultaneously presiding over Al-Nishiri’s commission. That was a problem because not only was one of the Attorney General’s subordinates from the Department of Justice detailed to the prosecution team in Al-Nishiri, but the Circuit Court was also more generally concerned because “the Attorney General plays an important institutional role in military commissions.” Opinion at 21.

The Court found the conflict of interest to be “intolerable,” declaring:

Unbiased, impartial adjudicators are the cornerstone of any system of justice worthy of the label.

Opinion at 17.

Simply put, “a judge cannot have a prospective financial relationship with one side yet persuade the other that he can judge fairly in the case.”

Opinion at 19 (citing Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1985)).

While the Court’s decision in Al-Nashiri arises from the Guantanamo Bay military commissions, the rationale from the opinion naturally reverberates into the military court-martial system. If the mere possibility of a future employment relationship between Judge Spath and the Attorney General in Al-Nashiri was problematic, then the consummated relationship between every court-martial’s military judge and their respective Judge Advocate General—who appoints them, removes them, and controls their future assignments—is a particularly precarious arrangement. It is that situation that invites a deeper examination of whether military judges may properly be considered not only impartial, but also independent.

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Well son you got a statement you’d like to make

Before the bailiff comes to forever take you away

Now judge judge I had debts no honest man could pay

The bank was holdin’ my mortgage and they was takin’ my house away

Now I ain’t sayin’ that makes me an innocent man

But it was more ‘n all this that put that gun in my hand

Well your honor I do believe I’d do better off dead

And if you can take a man’s life for the thoughts that’s in his head

Then won’t you sit back in that chair and think it over judge one more time

Let em’ shave off my hair and put me on the execution line

Bruce Springsteen, Johnny 99, on NEBRASKA (Columbia Records 1982)

The most recent publication of the Air Force Law Review contains an article delving into the propriety of allowing convicted servicemembers to make unsworn statements before sentencing in trials by court-martial. The article is by Air Force Major John S. Reid and is entitled “Undoing the Unsworn: The Unsworn Statement’s History and a Way Forward,” 79 A.F. L. Rev. 121 (2018).

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The International Commission of Jurists is a non-governmental organization focused on promoting the rule of law. It was founded in 1952 to investigate Soviet human rights abuses, but has expanded its practice since that time. The commissioners are 60 eminent judges, attorneys and academics from around the world. Their work has won prestigious awards from the Council of Europe and the United Nations.

In a recent publication entitled “The Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Gross Human Rights Violations,” the Commission opined:

Experience has shown that the judgment of gross human rights violations by military tribunals has frequently led to impunity for those violations, denial of the right to an effective remedy (especially as leading to prosecution and punishment of those responsible) and the denial of reparation to victims. This recurring phenomenon has led international bodies to hold that gross violations of human rights should be tried by civilian and not by military courts.

The Right to a Remedy, at 246. In turn, the Commission of Jurists defines “gross human rights violations” as:

Violations that affect in qualitative and quantitative terms the most basic rights of human beings, notably the right to life and the right to physical and moral integrity of the human person.

The Right to a Remedy, at xii. Accordingly, in the Commission of Jurists’ eyes, “gross human rights violations” would include:

Genocide, slavery and slave trade, murder, enforced disappearances, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, deportation or forcible transfer of population, and systematic racial discrimination[.] . . . Deliberate and systematic deprivation of essential foodstuffs, essential primary health care or basic shelter and housing may also amount to gross violations of human rights.

Id.

The Commission of Jurists also endorsed the view of the UN Commission on Human Rights, which has held:

The competence of military tribunals should be limited to strictly military offences committed by military personnel and should exclude military offenses committed against the civilian population.

The Right to a Remedy, at 247. The Commission of Jurists notes that several other prominent international organizations have similarly adopted the UN Commission on Human Rights’ position.

The Commission of Jurists concluded:

In sum, the competence of military justice should be defined by a functional criterion.  Military courts should have competence over offences of a military nature committed by military personnel. Gross human rights violations cannot be understood to ever constitute offences of a military nature and therefore should not, in principle, be tried by military courts.

The Right to a Remedy, at 250.

Readers may wonder what impact the International Commission of Jurists’ opinions might have on actual practice.

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Last week Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap, USAF (Ret.), who served as the Deputy JAG of the Air Force, published this article defending court-martial jurisdiction over retired members of the active components.

He writes:

Put simply, in the case of retired personnel voluntarily collecting retired pay, to include those in the Fleet Marine Reserve, they have chosen to keep a relationship with the military.

And indeed it’s true that nobody forces retired members to retire rather than separate at the end of a military career. Certainly there are financial and social benefits to retirement – retired pay, retired benefits, and retired status – but those benefits come with the costs of court-martial jurisdiction and the possibility of involuntary recall to active duty. That’s the deal.

Maj. Gen. Dunlap’s article also responds to many of the arguments made in the cert. petition in Larrabee (that was denied today), including the observation that Larrabee (who pleaded guilty to sexual assault at a general court-martial convened in Japan):

may now regret transferring to the Fleet Marine Reserve given the outcome of his trial, but my bet – based on literally everyone I know – is that the overwhelming majority of retired military personnel are proud of their service, and would hardly be pleased to have it downgraded to some lesser “connection” simply so that a rogue vet might not be held accountable in the military justice system.

That system, by the way, was recently characterized as a fair one by Justice Kagan in Ortiz. She noted it handles its cases “in strict accordance with a body of federal law (of course including the Constitution),” and offers “procedural protections… to a service member [that] are ‘virtually the same’ as those given in a civilian criminal proceeding, whether state or federal.” What, really, is wrong with judging military retirees in such forum? Would Larrabee have seriously preferred trial in Japanese court?

Undoubtedly Larrabee would have preferred a pardon. But considering that he pleaded guilty to sexual assault, it’s hard to see injustice in court-martial jurisdiction when he willingly (and almost-certainly eagerly) accepted that jurisdiction in exchange for the privileges and benefits of an active duty military retirement.

Of course, Larrabee wasn’t fully retired at the time of his court-martial. In the Navy and Marine Corps, an enlisted member with between 20 and 30 years of active duty service (like Larrabee) can separate, continue to serve, or be transferred to the Fleet Reserve (Sailors) or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (Marines), where the member will receive retainer pay until he or she reaches 30 years of service and eligibility for regular retirement. Nevertheless, members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve are in a status that – like regular retired members – includes court-martial jurisdiction. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(6).

It’s also worth mentioning that enlisted members are not entitled to transfer to the retired list until they complete 30 years of active duty service. Compare, for example, 10 U.S.C. § 7314 (soldier with 20 years may be retired), with 10 U.S.C. § 7317 (solder with 30 years shall be retired). So Larrabee’s status was doubly-voluntary; very much like an ordinary enlistment.

This blog has frequently discussed ongoing efforts to make the various disciplines of forensic science more reliable:

Scholarship Saturday: Strategies to improve the quality of expert testimony offered at trial (August 12, 2017)

Scholarship Saturday: The chronic problem of invalid expert opinion testimony (August 5, 2017)

Scholarship Saturday: DOJ asks the public to submit ideas on forensic science (April 15, 2017)

Scholarship Saturday: Forensic science standards beginning to take form (April 1, 2017)

Scholarship Saturday: Believe the accused (April 25, 2015)

A recent three-part video series entitled “False Positive”, created by Joss Fong and published by Vox Media, explores the issue anew, through the lens of the 1985 wrongful conviction of Robert Lee Stinson.

At 21 years old, Mr. Stinson was arrested and wrongfully incarcerated for 23 years because of unreliable in-court expert opinion testimony from two government forensic scientists.

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The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) became law on August 13, 2018 and has two provisions that are particularly important for dealing with domestic abuse incidents in the military – from January 1, 2019, on.

First, Congress has amended Article 128 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), to expressly state that the acts of strangulation or suffocation constitute aggravated assaults.

Second, a new enumerated offense entitled “Art. 128b. Domestic Violence” has been created.

This new crime punishes a broad range of misconduct.

Committing a violent offense (or violating a protective order with the intent to commit a violent offense) against a protected person is, of course, punishable under the new Article 128b.  But, so are non-violent offenses (including, expressly, violating protective orders or harming animals) when they are committed with the intent to intimidate or threaten a protected person.

These important legislative changes are not (yet) reflected in Part IV of the most current version of the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) published by the Joint Service Committee.

Accordingly, we do not yet have approved elements for use at trial, and no declared maximum punishment.  Practitioners will have to seek guidance elsewhere.

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Yesterday, the blog Lawfare published a timely piece written by Army judge advocate, Major Dan Maurer, entitled Trump’s Intervention in the Golsteyn Case: Judicial Independence, Military Justice or Both?  In the article, Major Maurer tries to make sense of a variety of recent developments impacting the military justice system.

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The Air Force Judge Advocate General’s School’s quarterly publication, The Reporter, has a new digital face, a new online home, and a new blog-like format. (Previous versions can still be found on the AFJAGS website here and here.)

Recent articles posted to the new site cover topics as varied as an assessment of recent efforts to provide law of war and human rights training to the Columbian military, to a practical guide to sentence rehearing proceedings.

An article from that publication, by Air Force Major R. Scott Adams, recently caught my eye: The Court-Martial of Private Vasily Shabunin: An Obscure Trial and its Lasting Impact on Novelist Leo Tolstoy. 

Major Adams’ article contains a detailed account of famed author Leo Tolstoy’s experience as a defense counsel representing a young Army Private who was ultimately executed for striking his Captain.  The article also notes that Tolstoy once, while weeping, said:

[The experience with Shabunin] had much more influence [on me] than all the seemingly more important events of life; the loss of or recovery of wealth, successes or failures in literature, even the loss of people close to me.

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When the Persian Gulf War started in August 1990 with naval interdiction operations, nearly a generation had passed since American war-fighters had been asked to engage in large scale combat. The Defense Department described the war as “the most important test of American arms in 25 years.” In this test of arms, Americans were introduced to a new, more civilized, mode of conflict:

The Coalition military campaign will be remembered for its effort, within the bounds of war, to be humane. Coalition airstrikes were designed to be as precise as possible. Coalition pilots took additional risks and planners spared legitimate military targets to minimize civilian casualties.

DoD Interim Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, at I-2.

This more restrictive method of fighting has persisted in American military operations for the past 28 years. Yet another generation has grown accustomed to fighting in a heavily-regulated, hyper-supervised manner.

A recent article published in the Army Lawyer article entitled Back to Basics: The Law of Armed Conflict and the Corrupting Influence of the Counterterrorism Experience, asserts that this experience has ingrained practices and attitudes in the U.S. military that would cripple it in a conflict with a near peer.

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A kind reader recently brought my attention to an article regarding consent published in the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law by Rutgers Law Professor Vera Bergelson. That article is entitled The Meaning of Consent, 12 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 171 (2014).

Professor Bergelson first posits that there are two methodologies for understanding the nature of consent.

The first method, the attitudinal method, argues that “consent means one’s subjective state of mind, ‘attitudinal’ consent.” The Meaning of Consent at 172. As an example of this method, which focuses on the internal thoughts of the victim, the article points to a New York case, People v. Bink, 84 A.D.2d 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). There, a prisoner reported that Bink was planning to sexually assault him the next morning. The putative victim declined the State’s offer of protection, and instead asked that guards watch and catch Bink “in the act.” The encounter occurred, observing guards did not intervene to stop the incident, and Bink was convicted of a sexual offense. His conviction was reversed, however, because, though the victim’s external conduct may not have disclosed it, the victim actually lacked the required attitudinal non-consent because he had “wanted to be assaulted.” K. Ferzan, Clarifying Consent: Peter Westen’s ‘The Logic of Consent’, 25 Law & Phil. 193, 214 (2006).

The second method, the performative method, asserts that consent requires “explicit permission by words or conduct to another’s act.” The Meaning of Consent at 174. As an example of this method, focusing on the perception of the accused as to the victim’s external behavior, Professor Bergelson points to a California case, People v. Burnham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1134 (Ct. App. 1986). There, in private, a husband beat his wife to force her into having sex with strangers. Later, to those strangers, she feigned consent and appeared a willing participant in sexual conduct. The husband was convicted of spousal rape and the strangers were not charged.

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A bit over 18 months ago, this column featured an article that was written by Air Force Judge Advocate Rodrigo Caruço and published by Vermont Law School: In Order to Form a More Perfect Court: A Quantitative Measure of the Military’s Highest Court’s Success as a Court of Last Resort, 41 Vt. L. Rev. 71.

In my original coverage, I explained that Major Caruço’s work first quantifies the extent to which CAAF’s decisions have tended towards error correction as opposed to the declaration of legal principles. After surveying comparable appellate courts in the civilian jurisdiction, his article posits that a healthy court of last resort – as CAAF should be – predominately engages in principle declaration – which CAAF does not.

My coverage of Major Caruço’s article posited that his measurement of the extent to which CAAF engages in the correction of errors rather than fulfilling its purpose of principle declaration may be an indicator of that court’s health, but it might better be seen as a measure of the overall health (or dysfunction) of the military justice system. My premise being that, in a healthy criminal justice system, a court of last resort should not have to correct many errors because those errors should have been corrected by subordinate reviewing courts and authorities. Instead, the court of last resort should be free – in a way that CAAF may not be – to focus its docket on cases which allow for the “declaration of legal principle by creation, clarification, extension, or overruling.” See J. Dickinson Phillips, Jr., The Appellate Review Function: Scope of Review, 47 Law & Contemp. Prob. 1 (Spring 1984).

Major Caruço’s work was recently featured in the University of Miami School of Law’s legal scholarship blog, the Journal of Things We Like (Lots) – JOTWELL.  Specifically, Professor Stephen I. Vladeck, of the University of Texas School of Law, penned a piece for JOTWELL entitled Why Military Justice Doesn’t Get Enough Academic Attention. In it he praised Major Caruço’s article as being a rare example of quality among “the paucity of good military justice scholarship[.]”

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An article entitled Ordered to Self Incriminate: The Unconstitutionality of Self-Report Policies in the Armed Forces, 78 A.F. L. Rev. 125, was recently published in the Air Force Law Review by Air Force Academy Assistant Professor of Law, Carman A. Leone (Major, USAF).

Professor Leone’s article offers a compelling argument that the Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard’s regulations requiring members to self-report their arrests by civilian authorities all run afoul of the Fifth Amendment.

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For the rest of the world, “a facility for quotation covers the absence of original thought.” Dorothy Sayers, Gaudy Night, 1935. To non-lawyers, quoting is viewed as “saving one the trouble of thinking for oneself, always a laborious business.” A.A. Milne, If I May, 1920.

But, in our profession, perhaps because of the common law’s reliance on stare decisis, an idea expressed as a direct quote from a published case is almost uniformly regarded as being better than one expressed using the author’s own voice. And, what’s better than that? An idea expressed as a direct quote from a case which was itself a direct quote from another case, complete with ‘internal quotations marks’, a team of [brackets] to reflect changes, ellipses thrown in here and there, all tied together with a string site that extends to the end of the page. Whatever the virtue of a quote-driven profession may be, the result is that our writing is painful to read.

Jack Metzler, the government lawyer behind the Twitter handle @SCOTUSplaces, has a proposed solution to the chaos – a new parenthetical: (cleaned up).

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Air Force Colonel Jeremy S. Weber recently published an article in the Cleveland State Law Review entitled, “Whatever Happened to Military Good Order and Discipline?” 66 Clev. St. L. Rev. 123 (2017).

Colonel Weber’s article starts by exploring the marked decline in the use of the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s “general article,” Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which criminalizes “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline.” Id. at 153-156. Colonel Weber posits that commanders have been less willing to use the “general article” to punish offenders for several reasons.

First, the general article has never been perceived as particularly fair:

Its broad scope has long been recognized as the ‘most comprehensive and potentially most subject to abuse; hence its traditional British nickname, “the Devil’s Article.’”

Id. at 131 (citation omitted).

But, there may be another reason as well – a more fundamental one. Commanders may not be holding their subordinates to the “good order and discipline” standard because nobody really knows what that phrase means.

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