CAAFlog » Military Justice Scholarship

Nine months ago, in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (Jun. 25, 2014) (link to slip op.), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested. An article in the March edition of The Army Lawyer addresses how this decision is likely to affect military justice, with a particular focus on CAAF’s interlocutory decision in United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93 (C.A.A.F. Feb. 20, 2014) (CAAFlog case page).

Though issued first, the Wicks decision is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley. While the CAAF analyzed the privacy doctrine exception to the warrant requirement and the Supreme Court considered the search incident to a lawful arrest exception, both came to the same conclusion: cell phones implicate a unique privacy interest that is protected under the Fourth Amendment.

The major implications of Riley are twofold. First, the opinion rejected the application of the Supreme Court’s container search jurisprudence to cell phone searches. Instead, the Court affirmed a balancing test and held that test should weigh strongly in favor of an individual’s privacy interest when it comes to cell phones. Second, Riley introduced an unprecedented perspective on the Fourth Amendment in light of modern technology and set a new standard for courts to apply when considering technological advancements that arise in Fourth Amendment cases.

Lindsay Windsor, What Riley v. California Means for Military Justice, Army Law., March 2015, at 7, 10 (available here). Of note, the author clerks for CAAF’s Judge Stucky.

The article is a short and approachable analysis of cell phone (and, impliedly, other tech-based) privacy issues in the military. It also includes this particularly interesting analysis:

Soldiers often use their personal cell phones to communicate with other units for military purposes. Such use implicates serious security concerns, but personal privacy interests are at stake too. If the personal cell phone becomes the default work cell phone, an individual’s expectation of privacy in it may be reduced: the government’s interest in protecting sensitive information could permit a search of otherwise private communications on the personal cell phone. It is therefore in the interests of both national security and personal privacy for servicemembers to distinguish clearly their personal and professional use of government and personal electronic devices.

Windsor, supra, at 12.

Last month the Army Lawyer published an article by Major Jeremy Stephens, Explaining the Extraordinary: Understanding the Writs Process, Army Law., February 2015, at 33 (available here). The article provides a primer on extraordinary relief in the military justice system. Specifically:

This article will discuss the legal underpinnings of extraordinary relief and outline the standard procedures for filing writs by defense counsel, trial counsel, and special victim counsel. It will also compare these procedures to those used when trial counsel file appeals under the procedures of Article 62 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Following the conclusion, a pair of appendices is included to assist practitioners in the basic analysis of whether to file a writ or an Article 62 appeal.

Stephens, supra, at 33.

The December 2014 issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter is titled Military Sentencing: Another Federal Sentencing System (Part 1). The full edition is not available for free online, but the table of contents (and previews of the articles) is available for free at this JSTOR link.

The issue includes an article by Chief Judge Baker of CAAF that is available for free online: James E. Baker, Is Military Justice Sentencing on the March? Should it be? And if so, Where should it Head? Court-Martial Sentencing Process, Practice, and Issues, 27 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 72-87 (2014-2015) (available here).

Noting that “military justice is an essential national security tool,” Chief Judge Baker’s article:

starts with a sketch of the military justice system to orient readers. Understanding that structure, the article then describes the sentencing process for special and general courts-martial. The article follows by identifying two core military sentencing questions: First, should commanders have authority to grant clemency? Second, should the military justice system adopt sentencing guidelines? With respect to each topic presented, the article does not attempt to answer the questions nor offer prescriptions. Rather, it seeks to identify the principal fault lines around which debate should, or will likely, fall. The article next presents ‘‘nutshell’’ introductions to additional sentencing matters that may warrant review as applied in the military context, including the handling of collateral matters, and the relationship between age and culpability.

Baker, supra, at 72.

The article is balanced, an interesting read, and worthy of your time this Saturday morning.

In an article published in the February 2015 edition of The Army Lawyer, Colonel James A. Young, USAF (Ret.) considers CAAF’s January 2014 decision in United States v. Moss, 73 M.J. 64 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (CAAFlog case page), in the context of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The article is titled Absent Without Leave on Appeal and the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, and it is available here.

CAAF’s opinion in Moss was something of a novelty. The appellant was charged with desertion, but two weeks before trial she absconded. She was subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced in absentia, and the CCA affirmed. CAAF then granted review, but the appellant remained absent and the court split 3-2 to find that the appellant’s continued absence (and her failure to ever clearly authorize an appeal to CAAF) deprived the court of jurisdiction because “the decision to appeal to [CAAF] is personal to an appellant.” 73 M.J. at 69.

Col Young analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions in Moss, and then considers the fugitive disentitlement doctrine:

In Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t has been well settled for well over a century that an appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice during the pendency of his appeal.” The justifications for such a rule are: (1) concerns about the enforceability of the appellate court’s judgment against the fugitive; (2) escape is “tantamount to waiver or abandonment” of the right to appeal; (3) “[i]t discourages the felony of escape and encourages voluntary surrender”; and (4) “[i]t promotes the efficient, dignified operation” of the appellate court. But there are limitations to the court’s discretion to dismiss. There must be “some connection between a defendant’s fugitive status and the appellate process, sufficient to make an appellate sanction a reasonable response.”

Young, supra, at 5. He concludes that military caselaw muddies the waters of the applicability of this doctrine in court-martial appeals, and that “CAAF should adopt this discretionary doctrine.” Young, supra, at 7.

Yet one can only hope that CAAF will not soon have an opportunity to do so.

Yesterday I posted some analysis of the Secretarial implementation of guidance for Article 32 preliminary hearings. The ensuing debate was quite contentious. It continues in this week’s Scholarship Saturday, with Jonathan Lurie, The Transformation of Article 32: Why and What?, 29 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc. 409 (2013) (available here).

The article is part of the Special Symposium Issue of the Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society: “The Threat From Within: Current and Alternative Response To Sexual Assault in the Military” (full contents available here). Jonathan Lurie is a professor emeritus at Rutgers University and he is the author of two books documenting the history of CAAF.

Professor Lurie’s article discusses the “‘notorious’ Article 32 investigation” in the Naval Academy sexual assault case (part of our #2 military justice story of 2014, and also a topic in my op-ed published in the Baltimore Sun), and he asserts that “the military judge who recommended that this case not be referred to a court-martial is the same official who permitted the excessive cross-examination of the alleged victim, later characterized as causing ‘heavy damage’ to the [sic] her testimony.” Lurie, supra, at 409-410. It was Navy Commander and military judge Robert Monahan who recommended that the charges not be referred for trial, and his report was quoted by the Washington Times as stating:

As difficult as it would be for the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (the alleged victim’s) professed lack of memory at the time Midshipman Graham engaged in sexual activity with her was due to her being substantially incapacitated, the government’s task becomes extremely more difficult, if not impossible, due to the heavy damage done to (the alleged victim’s) credibility at the Article 32 hearing.

Of course, the accused who actually suffered a trial by court-martial (a kid by the name of Midshipman Josh Tate) was ultimately acquitted of sexual assault after a bench trial before a military judge.

But that won’t stop a good narrative. Professor Lurie continues:

[O]riginally intended to protect the defendant, somehow Article 32 evolved into a device for abusive cross-examination of the plaintiff. To be sure, the presiding officer easily could have restrained defense counsel from the type of abusive cross-examination inflicted on the complainant.

Lurie, supra, at 411. Commander Monahan – who justly enjoys widespread respect as an excellent military judge – apparently is little more than a neanderthal misogynist. And as for those ruffians who represented the now-exonerated accused, Professor Lurie has a few choice words:

It will be recalled that in the “notorious” cross-examination conducted on behalf of the Annapolis football team defendants, their counsel subjected the complainant to what at best can be described as barely on the cusp of acceptable trial conduct, and at worst totally beyond appropriate trial procedure.

Lurie, supra, at 413. You read that right; both the Article 32 investigation as a whole, and the cross-examination of the alleged victim in particular, are separately described as “notorious.”

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The Army Lawyer recently republished a 2002 article by then-Major Timothy C. MacDonnell: Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief Discussion of the Constitutional and Jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two Courts (available here).

We’ve kept an eye on the progress of the military commissions at Guantanamo over the years (coverage here). The article provides valuable context to those proceedings.

The past few years presented an almost unrelenting stream of child pornography issues affecting military justice. CAAF’s decision in United States v. Barberi, 71 M.J. 127 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (CAAFlog case page), regarding what happens when some of the images supporting a child pornography conviction aren’t actually child pornography, is still somewhat unsettled, as this term CAAF is considering both a granted and a certified issue in United States v. Piolunek, No.s 14-5006/AF & 14-0283/AF (CAAFlog case page).

Additionally, various cases addressed whether certain images are child pornography, such as United States v. Rapp, No. 201200303 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2013) (discussed here); United States v. Blouin, 73 M.J. 694 (A. Ct. Crim. App. May 28, 2014), rev. granted, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. Oct. 23, 2014) (CAAFlog case page) (and related cases discussed here); and United States v. Lang, No. 20140083 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2014) (discussed here).

Another set of recent cases considered other imagery of minors, such as United States v. Warner, 73 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. Dec. 6, 2013) (CAAFlog case page); and United States v. Moon, 73 M.J. 382 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 11, 2014) (CAAFlog case page).

And, of course, the President enumerated child pornography offenses under Article 134 relatively recently: in 2011 (discussed here).

All of this makes court-martial prosecutions in child pornography cases a complex minefield of legal issues. This week’s Scholarship Saturday focuses on the intersection where that minefield meets another: The Confrontation Clause.

Child pornography forces us to re-confront and reevaluate the Confrontation Clause questions that arose in these recent cases, and it also raises new ones. Child pornography possession or distribution cases force the issue because the evidence in a child pornography prosecution consists of a range of evidence types, most of which include business records in the colloquial sense but many of which are not business records that meet the legal standard of the evidentiary exemption. These range from digital data collected routinely in the course of business and without targeting a particular user, to digital evidence collected, labeled, and assembled in preparation for prosecution. The first seems to be textbook business record exception; the second sounds like testimonial evidence that triggers a Confrontation Clause right. In practice, drawing the line between the two is not so clear, and the determinations raise fundamental questions that will apply to digital evidence standards more broadly.

Merritt Baer, Who is the Witness to an Internet Crime: The Confrontation Clause, Digital Forensics, and Child Pornography, 30 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 31, at 40-40 (2014) (available here).

Service members facing trial by court-martial and ordered into pretrial confinement increasingly find themselves in civilian facilities due to the lack of a local military confinement facility. This can happen post-trial as well, when a convicted service member awaits transfer to a military facility. A recent article in the Army Lawyer provides a comprehensive overview of the issues that this hybrid system poses:

Marc Wm. Zelnick, Managing an Installation’s Utilization of a Civilian Confinement Facility: A Primer, Army Law., December 2014, at 6 (available here).

Adultery is an enumerated offense under Article 134 – the “General Article” – which prohibits “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital.” 10 U.S.C. § 934. Hardly the most serious crime punishable under the UCMJ, adultery appears at the end of many charge sheets alleging far more serious offenses, and it has been derisively referred to as “a throw away charge.” United States v. Humphries, 71 M.J. 209, 217 n.10 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (CAAFlog case page) (quoting trial defense counsel). Yet despite the potential for overcharging, it doesn’t take much familiarity with military service to realize that adulterous acts can, under the right circumstances, be enormously disruptive to a unit and easily prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

However, an article recently published in the Hastings Women’s Law Journal breathlessly proclaims that “the criminalization of adultery represents too great an allocation of power when balancing a governmental interest and the individual protections guaranteed by the Constitution.” Krista Bordatto, The Crime Behind the Bedroom Door: Unequal Governmental Regulation of Civilian and Military Spouses, 26 Hastings Women’s L.J. 95 (2015) (available here). The author (an attorney and a first lieutenant in the Florida Army National Guard, though apparently not a judge advocate) proposes adding an element to the enumerated offense of adultery that would require:

That the sexual intercourse create an actual or clearly predictable adverse impact on discipline, authority, unit morale, unit cohesion, the ability of the command to accomplish its mission, or the ability of the accused to perform their duties to support the armed forces.

Id. at 119.

It’s hard to see how this proposal would actually change the current state of adultery prosecutions. In the Manual for Courts-Martial, the President already restricts adultery prosecutions to only those situations where the conduct is “directly prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Part IV, ¶ 62.c(2) (2012) (emphasis added). Moreover, military appellate courts do not hesitate to reverse adultery convictions that do not meet this heightened standard, even when the conviction is the result of a guilty plea. See, e.g., United States v. Jonsson, 67 M.J. 624, 627-628 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2009). In fact, the NMCCA reversed such a conviction just a few months ago. United States v. Freeberg, No. 201400172 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Sep. 30, 2014) (unpublished) (discussed here).

Unfortunately, the article gives only passing attention to this significant provision in the MCM that limits adultery prosecutions, and it totally overlooks cases like Jonsson.

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This is the third post in what I hope will be a weekly series about scholarly articles of interest to military justice practitioners. Please send any tips or suggested topics to

In an article that focuses on the Coast Guard’s sexual harassment policies while discussing a topic that is broadly applicable to all of the military services, Coast Guard Lieutenant Commander Bryan R. Blackmore suggests that:

The sexual-violence continuum provides a clear, straightforward conceptual model in which service members can understand the nature of sexual violence and how sexual harassment and sexual assault fit within the overarching construct of sexual violence. Rather than solely focusing on sexual harassment as a discrimination issue, the Coast Guard should view sexual harassment as offensive conduct within a continuum of sexual violence. In particular, by viewing sexual harassment as part of a continuum of sexual violence, it provides a framework from which the service can view all behaviors that enable, or serve as a precursor, to sexual assault.

Bryan R. Blackmore, Sexual Assault Prevention: Reframing the Coast Guard Perspective to Address the Lowest Level of the Sexual Violence Continuum—Sexual Harassment, 221 Mil. L. Rev. 75, 105-106 (Fall 2014) (available here).

Seeing an “artificial distinction between sexual harassment and sexual assault” in Coast Guard policy, the author finds that “Coast Guard policy is drafted in a manner to view sexual harassment as discrimination and sexual assault as criminal conduct. This oversimplification of the nature of sexual harassment minimizes the fact that sexual harassment is also misconduct, and it can be criminal conduct as well.” Blackmore, supra, at 116.

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This is the second post in what I hope will be a weekly series about scholarly articles of interest to military justice practitioners. Please send any tips or suggested topics to

In an article published in the Air Force publication The Reporter (available here), retired Colonel James Young (who is currently the Senior Legal Advisor to CAAF’s Judge Stucky) offers ten recommendations to reform court-martial procedure. They are:

  1. Remove authority from the convening authority to select court members, approve the findings and sentence, grant clemency, and preside over vacation proceedings.
  2. Eliminate summary courts-martial and grant field grade officers authority to impose confinement for 30 days as a nonjudicial punishment under Article 15.
  3. Establish standing courts.
  4. Modify special courts-martial to judge alone trials.
  5. Except in capital cases, require sentencing by the military judge. The military judge should be required to impose any sentence agreed to by both the convening authority and the accused.
  6. Require the service Secretaries to establish a system for randomly selecting court members.
  7. Require all counsel to be qualified and certified under Article 27(b).
  8. Modify the military appellate court system by: (1) granting all accused convicted of an offense at a general or special court-martial the right to appeal to an appellate court; (2) eliminating the service Courts of Criminal Appeals; (3) changing the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces from a discretionary appellate court sitting en banc to a court comprised of panels of three judges, operating in a manner similar to the U.S. circuit courts of appeals; and (4) removing restrictions from appeals to the Supreme Court.
  9. Require a verbatim record for every court-martial conviction.
  10. Consolidate the government appellate divisions so that when counsel purports to speak for the United States, it does so with one voice.

Each suggestion is accompanied by a brief discussion.

Note: This is the first of what I hope will be a weekly series about scholarly articles of interest to military justice practitioners. Please send any tips or suggested topics to

Pretrial confinement prior to trial by court-martial is permitted only when:

(1) An offense triable by court-martial has been committed;
(2) The person confined committed it; and
(3) Confinement is required by the circumstances.

RCM 305(d). Then, once a person is confined, continued pretrial confinement is permitted only when a preponderance of the evidence proves that:

(i) An offense triable by a court-martial has been committed;
(ii) The prisoner committed it; and
(iii) Confinement is necessary because it is foreseeable that:
(a) The prisoner will not appear at trial, pretrial hearing, or investigation, or
(b) The prisoner will engage in serious criminal misconduct; and
(iv) Less severe forms of restraint are inadequate.

RCM 305(h)(2)(B). See also RCM 305(i)(2)(A).

Notably absent from these rules is any explicit consideration of the seriousness of the allegations against the accused

A recent article by Major Ryan W. Leary, U.S. Army, published in the Military Law Review, provides a powerful argument for changing these rules. Major Leary argues that “the military justice system should presume, for certain serious offenses, that absent pre-trial confinement an accused will either flee or harm members of the surrounding community.” Major Ryan W. Leary, Serious Offense: Considering the Severity of the Charged Offense When Applying the Military’s Pre-Trial Confinement Rules, 221 Mil. L. Rev. 131, 133 (Fall 2014) (available here).

Using the interrupted court-martial of one Sergeant Evenson – that ended when the unconfined accused absconded and was killed in a confrontation with authorities – Major Leary provides an excellent primer on the history of the current rules for pretrial confinement. Then, after defining the issue as “how to change the RCM to handle cases where an accused is facing serious charges and severe punishment,” 221 Mil. L. Rev. at 143, Major Leary notes that in the federal system the Bail Reform Act:

creates a rebuttable presumption that there is no set of conditions that will assure the presence of a defendant at trial and protect the safety of the community in the case of a defendant accused of certain crimes (e.g., certain drug offenses, terrorism, human trafficking, and crimes involving a minor victim).

Id. at 144. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). Major Leary proposes applying such a rebuttable presumption to the military (without identifying any specific offenses that would qualify):

Applying the BA’s rebuttable presumption to the pre-trial confinement system in the military is a feasible solution to prevent the issue that presented itself in SGT Evenson’s case—the failure to timely address the flight risk associated with the serious nature of the charged crimes and a potential life sentence facing an accused. The rebuttable presumption meets constitutional muster and can practically be applied to the military system. Therefore, it is worth consideration as a means of mitigating the pre-trial risk of flight or additional misconduct inherent in cases like SGT Evenson’s.

221 Mil. L. Rev. at 151.

I’m not sure if I agree that such a rebuttable presumption is a good idea in the military justice system, but I think I could be convinced. One thing that concerns me is the fact that pretrial confinement is all-or-nothing, due to the lack of bail. As Chief Judge Sullivan wrote two decades ago:

The Courtney decision [Courtney v. Williams, 1 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1976)], for instance, assures the pretrial release of all except those whose confinement is absolutely necessary and, in this manner, seeks to minimize the prejudice to military accused from the absence of any opportunity for bail, an opportunity that is constitutionally guaranteed to civilian criminal defendants under the Eighth Amendment.

United States v. Kossman, 38 M.J. 258, 265-66 (C.M.A. 1993) (Sullivan, C.J. dissenting).

However, Major Leary’s article is well-written and the proposal deserves serious consideration.

There was a lively debate in the comments section of my October post titled: The Army CCA applies Cimball Sharpton to (erroneously) affirm larceny from a debit card holder. In my post I argued that a service member’s fraudulent use of another person’s debit card was a larceny from the merchants where the card was used, and not from the account holder, even when the fraudulent use of the card caused a reduction in the account holder’s balance, and I concluded that the Army CCA was wrong to affirm (in a published opinion) an appellant’s guilty plea to larceny from another service member based on such fraudulent activity.

That conclusion drew some thoughtful opposition in the comments section, but I stuck with my analysis. The appellant petitioned CAAF for review on December 3, 2014 (No. 15-0202/AR), so it will likely be a few more months before we learn if I was right.

But an article published in the November issue of the Army Lawyer adds support to my argument:

In the case of a debit card relationship, an account holder has deposited money with the bank against which the POS or ATM transactions are drawn; however, due to the military courts’ application of commercial law principles, the account holder is not the “owner” of her deposits within the meaning of Article 121. Absent special arrangements, the title to the money deposited is transferred to the bank when a deposit is made by the account holder into his her account.

This is true because money deposited with a financial institution, absent special arrangements, is considered a general deposit. In the case of general deposits, “[t]he general transaction between the bank and a customer in the way of deposits to a customer’s credit, and drawing against the account by the customer, constitute the relation of creditor and debtor.” As such, there “is nothing of a trust or fiduciary nature in the transaction, nor anything in the nature of a bailment . . . or in the nature of any right to the specific monies deposited.” Thus, the account holder has neither title to nor possession of the money in his or her debit account—only an agreement from the bank “to pay an equivalent consideration when called upon by the depositor in the usual course of business.”

The same is true in the case of a credit card agreement. The relationship between the bank and the account holder is one of creditor and debtor—the roles being reversed such that the account holder, not the bank, is the debtor. Just as in a debit card relationship, the credit-card account holder has neither title to nor possession of the line of credit that is extended by the bank.

Major Benjamin M. Owens-Filice, “Where’s the Money Lebowski?” — Charging Credit and Debit Card Larcenies Under Article 121, UCMJ, Army Law., August 2014, at 3, 9 (direct link to article).

The article is a comprehensive review of this topic, and it includes a handy chart on the last page. I think the article is entirely consistent with my October post, and I encourage anyone litigating a larceny case to read both the article and my post.

That’s the title of my most recent contribution to the LexisNexis Emerging Issues Analysis in Military Law series, available here.

Note: This item is not available to the public for free. However, I believe that most military attorneys have access to it at no cost through service-provided research tools. I do not receive a percentage of any sales of this analysis.

That’s the title of an immensely valuable article authored by Army Major Takashi Kagawa and published in the October 2014 edition of The Army Lawyer. The article is available here.

Major Kagawa provides a fairly comprehensive overview of the immigration laws and how they are enforced, an analysis of the ways these laws can affect service members, and guidance for prosecutors and defense counsel. Additionally, the article includes a number of valuable appendices, one of which (Appendix G) includes a chart of (what looks to be) every offense listed in the MCM along with Major Kagawa’s analysis of the associated immigration consequences.

I think the article is essential reading for any military justice practitioner.