CAAF decided the Army case of United States v. Wilson, __ M.J. __, No. 16-0267/AR (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.), on Friday, January 13, 2017. Considering an issue raised personally by the appellant, CAAF concludes that a fenced motor pool is not a structure for the purposes of housebreaking in violation of Article 130, 10 U.S.C. § 930. Accordingly, the appellant’s housebreaking conviction is factually insufficient and CAAF reverses the conviction and the decision of the Army CCA.
Judge Ryan writes for a unanimous court.
Specialist (E-4) Wilson and an accomplice entered the 3rd Brigade Special Troops Battalion motor pool at Fort Benning, Georgia, intending to steal batteries. They were caught. Wilson pleaded guilty to larceny in violation of Article 121 (for prior thefts) but he contested a charge of housebreaking of the motor pool in violation of Article 130.
The offense of housebreaking requires unlawful entry into a building or structure. The motor pool at issue, however, “is a concrete lot completely surrounded by a fence. . . used for the storage and maintenance of military property, including vehicles.” Slip op. at 3. The motor pool contains sotrage buildings, but Wilson did not enter any building “nor did he cut any locks, open any doors, or climb through the windows of any building.” Slip op. at 3.
At trial Wilson moved for a finding of not guilty arguing that the motor pool did not qualify as a structure under Article 130. The military judge denied the motion. Wilson renewed his argument on appeal but it was rejected by the Army CCA. CAAF then granted review of a single issue:
Whether the military judge erred in denying the defense motion for appropriate relief under Rule for Court-Martial 917 where the military judge improperly applied Article 130, housebreaking, to a motor pool.
CAAF finds that the military judge did err.