Opinion Analysis: CAAF finds actual waiver – and does not reach waiver by operation of law – in United States v. Haynes
CAAF decided the Army case of United States v. Haynes, 79 M.J. 17, No. 18-0359/AR (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.), on July 2, 2019. A divided court reaches the narrow conclusion that the conduct of defense counsel at trial affirmatively waived the issue of credit for prior punishment (known as Pierce credit). Accordingly, CAAF affirms the decision of the Army CCA that denied credit in this case.
Chief Judge Stucky writes for the court, joined by Judges Ryan and Sparks. Judge Ohlson and Judge Maggs each write separate opinions that concur in the result (the denial of credit) but dissent from the finding of waiver.
Private (E-1) Haynes pleaded guilty to numerous offenses pursuant to a pretrial agreement. Two of those offenses were wrongful use of marijuana, and Haynes admitted that he smoked marijuana on an almost-daily basis in an effort to get kicked out of the Army. But in addition to his court-martial conviction for wrongful use of marijuana, Haynes also received nonjudicial (Article 15) punishment for wrongful use of marijuana in the same general time period. That raised the possibility that Haynes was punished twice – the first time by nonjudicial punishment and the second time by the court-martial – for a single offense.
Thirty years ago, in United States v. Pierce, CAAF’s predecessor explained that such double punishment, while not a violation of the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment or the similar protection in Article 44, “would violate the most obvious, fundamental notions of due process of law,” and so “an accused must be given complete credit for any and all nonjudicial punishment suffered: day-for-day, dollar-for-dollar, stripe-for-stripe.” 27 M.J. 367, 369 (C.M.A. 1989) (emphasis omitted). Ten years later, in United States v. Gammons, 51 M.J. 169, 183 (C.A.A.F. 1999), CAAF gave an accused four options regarding that credit: put the prior punishment into evidence at sentencing before members, raise it with the military judge alone, raise it with the convening authority (who, at the time, had unlimited power to reduce the sentence for that or any other reason), or not raise the issue of credit at all.
Haynes neither requested nor received any credit for his prior nonjudicial punishment at trial or when the convening authority acted. Instead, the issue was raised for the first time at the Army CCA. The CCA, however, found waiver, concluding that CAAF’s opinion in Gammons “requir[es] an accused to raise the issue of Pierce credit to either the court-martial or to the [convening authority] to avoid waiver as a matter of law.” United States v. Haynes, 77 M.J. 753, 756 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2018). The CCA considered granting Haynes credit anyway (as part of its plenary review of the findings and sentence), but it determined that the facts of this case do not warrant relief despite the waiver. CAAF then granted review of two issues:
I. Whether an appellant is authorized to request Pierce credit for the first time at a Court of Criminal Appeals.
II. If the Army Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the failure to request Pierce credit below constituted waiver, was its actual review of this issue under its article 66(c), UCMJ authority still sufficient?
In yesterday’s decision a majority of the court finds that the conduct of Haynes’ defense counsel at trial amounts to an affirmative waiver of the right to any credit for the nonjudicial punishment, with Chief Judge Stucky explaining that the majority does not reach – and so does not endorse – the question decided by the Army CCA (“whether Appellant also waived the issue of Pierce credit by operation of law,” slip op. at 5). Judge Ohlson and Maggs do not agree that the defense counsel’s conduct amounts to waiver, but they nevertheless agree that Haynes is not entitled to credit based on the record in this case.