CAAF will hear oral argument in the capital case of United States v. Akbar, No. 13-7001/AR (CAAFlog case page), on Tuesday, November 18, 2014. The court is conducting mandatory review of the case pursuant to Article 67(a)(1) because the appellant was sentenced to death after he was convicted contrary to his pleas of not guilty, by a general court-martial composed of members with enlisted representation, of two specifications of premeditated murder and three specification of attempted premeditated murder, in violation of Articles 118 and 80.

Appellant attacked fellow soldiers in Kuwait in 2003, killing two and wounding 14 others, leading to his court-martial and death sentence in 2005. The Army CCA affirmed the death sentence in 2012 (discussed here). Notably, Akbar is one of only six military death row inmates. The whole list (in the order sentence was adjudged) is: Gray, Loving, Akbar, Witt, Hennis, and Hasan.

Akbar’s brief to CAAF raises 59 assignments of error, but the court’s website identifies only five as set for oral argument next week:

(1) Whether the Appellant was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, at every critical stage of his court-martial;

(2) Whether this Court should order a post-trial evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed factual issues relevant to Appellant’s numerous collateral claims unless the Court finds in his favor on another dispositive ground;

(3) Whether the prosecution’s victim impact presentation and argument, and counsel’s failure to object, violated Appellant’s Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights;

(4) Whether the military judge denied Appellant a fair trial by failing to sua sponte dismiss fourteen of the fifteen panel members for cause based on actual and implied bias manifested by relationships of the members, a predisposition to adjudge death, an inelastic opinion against considering mitigating evidence on sentencing, visceral reactions to the charged acts, preconceived notions of guilt, and detailed knowledge of uncharged misconduct that had been excluded; and

(5) Whether the analysis of the Army Court of Criminal Appeals of Appellant’s case was flawed because of its misapplication of the standards applicable to federal and state capital defense counsel and that court’s determination that counsel were “well-qualified.”

CAAF granted each side an hour to present oral argument (typically each side receives just 20 minutes).

Appellant’s brief is 328 pages, the Government’s answer is 350 pages, and Appellant’s reply brief is 58 pages. Because of the number of issues in this case, I’m not going to engage in my normal analysis of the briefs in advance of the oral argument. However, I do note that the fifth issue to be argued has echoes of Judge Mitchell’s dubitante opinion in the Air Force CCA’s approval of the death sentence in United States v. Witt, No. 36785, __ M.J. __ (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jun. 30, 2014) (discussed here).

I’ll also note two informative posts about the military death penalty system from our archives (both written by Dwight Sullivan). The first is from 2007: Military death penalty system by the numbers. The second is from 2009: Military death penalty stats: building the pyramid.

Case Links:
CAAFlog case page
ACCA opinion
Appellant’s brief
Appellee’s (Government) brief
Appellant’s reply brief
Blog post: Argument preview

In a pair of cases decided in 2012, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a right to effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. In Missouri v. Frye, the Court held that “as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). In Lafler v. Cooper, the Court held that when a defendant rejects a plea deal on the advice of counsel, that rejection will not be prejudicial unless there is a showing of “a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.” 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012).

In a recent published opinion in United States v. Valmont, __ M.J. __, No. 20110644 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 22, 2014) (link to slip op.), the Army CCA considers a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in the plea negotiation process. The appellant was convicted contrary to his pleas of not guilty, by a general court-martial composed of members with enlisted representation, of premeditated murder in violation of Article 118(a). He was sentenced to confinement for life without the possibility of parole, reduction to E-1, total forfeitures, and a dishonorable discharge. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged.

The IAC claim is primarily an assertion that the appellant’s five defense counsel (two military, three civilians) failed to communicate to him plea offers from the Government that would have limited his confinement to a term of years. The court’s recitation of facts is four pages of dense he-said / they-said claims, but it’s clear that the appellant rejected an initial offer that would have limited his confinement to 50 years, that he wanted (but never formally proposed) a deal that limited his confinement to no more than 30 or 40 years, and that there were ongoing informal discussions by email between the appellant’s civilian defense counsel and the trial counsel.

The CCA rejects the IAC claim. This rejection is mostly based on the informality of the discussions between the trial counsel and the defense, noting that Frye only requires communication of formal plea deals.

Read more »

CAAF granted review in two cases last week. One was another ultimate offense doctrine case:

No. 14-0650/AR. U.S. v. Kenneth E. Hagstrom. CCA 20121058. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ACCEPTING APPELLANT’S PLEAS OF GUILT TO DISOBEYING THE ORDER OF HIS COMMANDER IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 90, UCMJ, WHEN THE ULTIMATE OFFENSES AT ISSUE WERE THE MINOR OFFENSES OF RESTRICTION BREAKING DESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE 134, UCMJ, AND THE RECORD DOES NOT REFLECT APPELLANT’S UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ORDER IMPOSING RESTRICTION WAS ISSUED WITH THE FULL AUTHORITY OF HIS COMMANDER’S OFFICE TO LIFT THE DUTY “ABOVE THE COMMON RUCK.”

No briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

Notably, this is the fourth trailer to United States v. Phillips, No. 14-0199/AR (CAAFlog case page), which was argued on October 20.

The other grant was in a Navy case:

No. 14-0744/NA. U.S. v. Allyssa K. Simmermacher. CCA 201300129. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corp Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHEN THE GOVERNMENT DESTROYS EVIDENCE ESSENTIAL TO A FAIR TRIAL, THE RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL REQUIRE THE MILITARY JUDGE TO ABATE THE PROCEEDINGS. HERE, THE GOVERNMENT NEGLIGENTLY DESTROYED THE SOLE PIECE OF EVIDENCE THAT PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR APPELLANT’S CONVICTION PRIOR TO BOTH THE REFERRAL OF CHARGES AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF DEFENSE COUNSEL. SHOULD THE MILITARY JUDGE HAVE ABATED THE PROCEEDINGS?

Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

The NMCCA’s opinion is available here. The CCA affirmed the appellant’s conviction for wrongful use of cocaine despite the fact that the Government destroyed the appellant’s urine sample one year after it tested positive (in accordance with standard policy), preventing the appellant from obtaining a retest.

This is the second CAAF grant in a Navy case in a month (the other was United States v. Castillo, No. 14-0724/NA (CAAFlog case page)), and they occur after a term in which CAAF didn’t hear oral argument in any Navy cases.

This week at SCOTUS: I’m not aware of any military justice developments at the Supreme Court, where I’m tracking one case:

This week at CAAF: The next scheduled oral argument at CAAF is on November 18, 2014.

This week at the ACCA: The next scheduled oral argument at the Army CCA is on December 10, 2014.

This week at the AFCCA: The next scheduled oral argument at the Air Force CCA is on November 24, 2014.

This week at the CGCCA: The Coast Guard Trial Docket shows no scheduled oral arguments at the Coast Guard CCA.

This week at the NMCCA: The next scheduled oral argument at the Navy-Marine Corps CCA is on November 20, 2014.

Update: A reader informs me that the Court of Military Commissions Review (USCMCR) will hear oral argument of a Government interlocutory appeal in the military commission case of United States v. al-Nashiri on Thursday, November 13, 2014, at 10 a.m. The argument will occur in Courtroom 201 at the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 717 Madison Place, NW, Washington, DC.

The Office of Military Commissions website has a case page that explains that:

Al-Nashiri is charged with perfidy, murder in violation of the law of war, attempted murder in violation of the law of war, terrorism, conspiracy, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects, and hazarding a vessel. The charges arise out of an attempted attack on the USS THE SULLIVANS in January 2000, an attack on the USS COLE in October 2000, and an attack on the MV Limburg in October 2002.

The Limburg is a French oil tanker, raising the issue of whether a military commission has jurisdiction over the attack. Writing for Lawfare in this post, Wells Bennett explained that the Government failed to prove (or even really try to prove, it seems) facts that support commission jurisdiction. In a subsequent post, available here, Mr. Bennett covered the Government’s filing of an appeal. All of Mr. Bennett’s extensive coverage of the al-Nashiri case on Lawfare is available here.

The current version of Article 120 involves four separate statutes: Article 120 (adult sexual offenses), Article 120a (stalking), Article 120b (child sexual offenses), and Article 120c (other sexual misconduct). All except for Article 120a are relatively new; they were enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (discussed here) (see also our Article 120 (2012) category) and they took effect on June 28, 2012.

Among other things, Article 120c prohibits “indecent viewing, visual recording, or broadcasting.” These three offenses involve knowingly and wrongfully viewing, recording, or broadcasting “the private area of another person, without that other person’s consent and under circumstances in which that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Article 120c(a).

But the reach of Article 120c(a)(1) is now significantly limited by a published decision from a three-judge panel of the Navy-Marine Corps CCA in United States v. Quick, __ M.J. __, No. 201300341 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2014) (link to slip op.). Senior Judge Fischer writes for the panel, finding that the offense of indecent viewing requires that an accused actually view the real-life private area of a person. The CCA reverses the appellant’s conviction for merely viewing a recording (made surreptitiously) of another person’s private area, finding that the specification fails to state an offense.

Read more »

This week at SCOTUS: I’m not aware of any military justice developments at the Supreme Court, where I’m tracking one case:

This week at CAAF: The next scheduled oral argument at CAAF is on November 18, 2014.

This week at the ACCA: The Army CCA will hear oral argument in one case this week, on Thursday, November 6, 2014, at 10 a.m.:

United States v. Audet, No. 20120574

Issue: Whether the appellant was denied the opportunity to adequately defend against the charge of abusive sexual contact where the panel’s finding by exceptions and substitutions resulted in a material variance.

This week at the AFCCA: The next scheduled oral argument at the Air Force CCA is on November 24, 2014.

This week at the CGCCA: The Coast Guard Trial Docket shows no scheduled oral arguments at the Coast Guard CCA.

This week at the NMCCA: The Navy-Marine Corps CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

I missed it, but thought we’d post a link to the very quiet retirement of a general accused of “sexual misconduct.”  Stars and Stripes article, here, about the retirement of Maj. Gen. Ralph O. Baker.  Here is a link to prior coverage of allegations of sexual assault against now Brigadier General Baker.

The link, here, isn’t working and directs you to the address http://nomorearticle31blog.wordpress.com/.  If it has gone the way of . . . sequestration (?) . . . it would be nice if TJAG School could at least allow all the prior posts to be accessible.

H/T OFFL

Here is a link to a federal register notice of a meeting of the Judicial Proceedings Panel scheduled for November 14, 2014, at the Holiday Inn Arlington at Ballston, 4610 N. Fairfax Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22203.

I discussed the DoD’s establishment of the panel in this post. The panel’s website is: http://jpp.whs.mil/

CAAF granted review in three cases last week:

No. 14-0656/AR.  U.S. v. Dana P. BLOUIN.  CCA 20121135.  On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision for the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY ACCEPTING APPELLANT’S PLEAS OF GUILTY TO THE SPECIFICATION OF THE CHARGE WHERE PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 4 DEMONSTRATED THAT THE IMAGES POSSESSED WERE NOT CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.

Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

Phil discussed the Army CCA’s opinion affirming the guilty plea in this post. The CCA’s opinion is available here.

No. 14-0660/AR.  U.S. v. Michael C. BUDKA.  CCA 20120435.  On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issues:

WHETHER THE ARMY COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY VIOLATING THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTY PRESENTATION WHEN IT SUMMARILY AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS AND SENTENCE AFTER THE GOVERNMENT CONCEDED THAT THE FACTUAL PREDICATE FOR THE OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WAS NOT MET.

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION BY ACCEPTING APPELLANT’S PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE SPECIFICATION OF CHARGE II-AGGRAVATED ASSAULT-WHERE THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS TO QUESTION THAT THE FORCE USED WAS A MEANS LIKELY TO PRODUCE DEATH OR GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM.

Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

The CCA affirmed without a written opinion.

No. 14-0792/AR.  U.S. v. Collin J. CARTER.  CCA 20121046.  On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION BY PREVENTING DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM PRESENTING FACTS OF APPELLANT’S UNLAWFUL PRETRIAL PUNISHMENT AS MITIGATION EVIDENCE AT SENTENCING.

Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

The CCA affirmed without a written opinion.

KTUU.com Anchorage reports, here, that an  Alaska-based soldier’s court-martial  on murder and rape charges will begin next Monday at Joint Base Lewis McChord.  Sgt. Nathaniel Ulroan is charged with the premeditated murder of his three year old son and the rape of his wife. AP (via S&S) coverage here.

Former USAFA Cadet convicted of abusive sexual contact raises profile as standout on Alcorn Srltate football squad, ABC News coverage here. The article has some commentary on the Mil Jus system’s handling of Cadet Cooks’ case and sexual assault cases in general. Prior coverage here.

In a per curiam opinion in United States v. Freeberg, No. 201400172 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Sep. 30, 2014) (link to unpub. op.), a three-judge panel of the NMCCA reverses a plea of guilty to adultery in violation of Article 134, with this important reminder:

In 2002, the President issued Executive Order 13,262, 67 F.R. 18773, 18778 (2002), amending the MCM to create a separate explanation of the terminal element unique to adultery offenses. See United States v. Jonsson, 67 M.J. 624 (C.G.C.C.A. 2009). Since then, the MCM provides, “To constitute an offense under the UCMJ, the adulterous conduct must either be directly prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting. Adulterous conduct that is directly prejudicial to good order and discipline includes conduct that has an obvious, and measurably divisive effect on unit or organization discipline, morale, or cohesion, or is clearly detrimental to the authority or stature of or respect toward a servicemember.” MCM (2012 ed.), Part IV, ¶ 62c(2). “Discredit means to injure the reputation of the armed forces and includes adulterous conduct that has a tendency, because of its open or notorious nature, to bring the service into disrepute, make it subject to public ridicule, or lower it in public esteem.” Id. The explanation then goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when determining whether adulterous acts are prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting.

This new explanation operated to narrow the scope of adultery as an offense under the UCMJ.

Slip op. at 5. The CCA reversed the plea after finding that military judge failed “to ensure the appellant understood the meaning of prejudice to good order and discipline and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces not only in a generic Article 134 sense, but in the narrower sense defined by the President specifically for the offense of adultery.” Slip op. at 6 (marks omitted).

A case in the Air Force out of Dover AFB. Civilian prosecutors dropped a child sexual abuse case, but the military pushed forward. Air flforce Times has the report on SGTbJesus Munoz’s acquittal here. The Sergeants attorney’s spin:

“We presented housing and deployment records” at the trial, Waddington said. When the child testified, “he admitted he and his mother had been practicing a long time what he should say [on the stand]. … He said that if he didn’t come up with something, [he] was going to get in a lot of trouble.”

Patrick Air Force base public affairs had not responded Monday to an Oct. 24 request to speak to the prosecutor on the case.

Does this make the system look better or worse that it takes cases civilians refuse to prosecute and then the prosecution loses the case?  Because it happens in the sexual assault area a lot.

Iraq war deserters still in Canada, Winnipeg News reports here.

The Air Force is investigating how Chief Master Sergeant Eric Soluri was promoted three times after being convicted and serving jail time for a domestic violence offense. AF Times report here.

MSGT Timothy Hennis files ex write at CAAF, FayObs report here. Hennis, for our occasional reader, was tried three times for the murder of Kathryn Eastburn, the wife of an Air Force captain who was out of town on temporary duty.  She was raped and killed in the Eastburn family’s home outside Fort Bragg on 9 May 1985.  The Eastburns’ three- and five-year-old daughters were also murdered.  Their infant baby was left alone in her crib.  The baby’s cries two days after the murders alerted neighbors that something was wrong.  Law enforcement officials quickly focused on Timothy Hennis, a soldier at Fort Bragg who had been to the Eastburns’ home to pick up a dog a few days before the murders.  In 1986, Hennis was tried by the state of North Carolina for the three murders and rape.  He was convicted and sentenced to death.  The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to present numerous grizzly crime-scene and autopsy photographs during the guilt/innocence stage.  State v. Hennis, 372 S.E.2d 523 (N.C. 1988).  Two justices dissented.  Id. at 528-31.  In 1989, Hennis was retried by the State of North Carolina and acquitted.  After advances in DNA revealed new evidence implicating Hennis, the military recalled him from the retired list to try him–his recall and the question of jurisdiction is the source of his ex writ–where he was convicted and sentenced to death.   See the rest of the story at our Top 10 post here.

Thanks to all of our zombie contributors for correcting my hastily posted prior version–it is your week and all.

The Coast Guard CCA’s unpublished opinion in United States v. Sullivan, No. 20140925 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. Sep. 25, 2014) (link to unpub. op), is notable for a number of reasons. For starters, the case involves a Coast Guard Captain (O-6) who was convicted contrary to his pleas of not guilty, by a general court-martial composed of officer members, of a single specification of wrongful use of cocaine in violation of Article 112a. He was sentenced to pay a $5,000 fine and to be reprimanded. That sentence does not trigger automatic review by the CCA, but the Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard referred the case to the court under Article 69(d).

The CCA considered numerous assertions of error, ultimately rejecting them and affirming the findings and sentence. One assertion of error – involving the rebuttal testimony of a Government witness – caught my attention.

The charge against the appellant was based on a positive urinalysis result. The appellant’s defense was based on the assertion that his wife’s drug use resulted in the appellant’s “innocent and unwitting exposure to cocaine.” Slip op. at  12. In support of this assertion, the appellant’s wife “testified during the defense case concerning her procurement, storage and consumption of cocaine.” Slip op. at 12. But in the Government’s case in rebuttal:

Inspector D, a Senior Inspector for the Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Office, was offered and qualified as an expert in street-level narcotics. (R. at 1957.) He testified, based on his experience as an undercover investigator, concerning the standard process for purchasing powder cocaine, and typical practices for using powder cocaine. (R. at 1959-69.) His descriptions differed in several ways from Appellant’s wife’s descriptions of her experience and practices.

Slip op. at 11. The Defense objected to the expert’s testimony. The CCA explains that “the military judge conducted a lengthy Article 39(a) session—which included a full preview of Inspector D’s testimony—and heard extensive argument from counsel before determining that Inspector D had specialized knowledge that would be helpful to members charged with determining the facts of the case,” but it does not otherwise describe the judge’s reasoning in permitting the testimony. Slip op. at 12.

What immediately comes to mind is last term’s decision in United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. Jul 8, 2014) (CAAFlog case page), where a divided CAAF reversed a conviction for aggravated sexual assault after determining that the judge failed to conduct the appropriate analysis prior to allowing a former sexual assault response coordinator to testify as an expert witness, and that the record ultimately did not support allowing such testimony. In particular, Judge Ohlson’s opinion of the court focused on the six-part test from United States v. Houser:

(1) the qualifications of the expert, (2) the subject matter of the expert testimony, (3) the basis for the expert testimony, (4) the legal relevance of the evidence, (5) the reliability of the evidence, and (6) whether the probative value of the testimony outweighs other considerations.

Flesher, slip op. at 14 n.3 (citing Houser, 36 M.J. 392, 397 (C.M.A. 1993)). In Sullivan, the Coast Guard court doesn’t explain what – if any – analysis the judge conducted using these factors, and it seems like the testimony is unlikely to satisfy at least some of these factors. Instead, the CCA’s opinion focuses on value of the testimony for impeachment of the appellant’s wife.

Read more »

About two months ago, in this post, Phil discussed the Army CCA’s decision that rejected a Government interlocutory appeal in United States v. Muwwakkil, No. 20140536 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2014) (link to unpub. op.). The appeal was of a military judge’s ruling that stuck the entire testimony of an alleged victim of rape. The military judge struck the testimony because the Government lost the recording of the alleged victim’s testimony at the Article 32 pretrial investigation. Affirming the judge, the CCA reasoned:

The government concedes simple negligence for the loss of the recording, but contends that any finding of gross negligence is clearly erroneous. However, as the government correctly points out, the judge never did make a clear finding of gross negligence. In any event, the judge’s finding that the government’s loss of the required statement was due to its negligence is amply supported by evidence in the record and necessarily triggers the totality of circumstances test described above to determine an appropriate remedy for the Jencks Act violation.

There is no evidence that the government destroyed the statement in “good faith” or was otherwise blameless in its destruction. See, e.g., Carrasco, 537 F.2d at 376; Lewis, 38 M.J. at 508 (citing Jarrie, 5 M.J. at 195). Beyond that, the government simply disagrees with the judge’s exercise of her discretion as to the proper remedy. Any disagreement any of us might have with the judge’s exercise of discretion under these circumstances is no basis for relief under Article 62. See Baker, 70 M.J. at 288 (“[T]he question is not whether a reviewing court might disagree with the trial court’s findings, but whether those findings are ‘fairly supported by the record.’”) (citation omitted). Indeed the law demands that we respect and defend the reasoned exercise of a trial judge’s discretion in cases such as these and so we do here.

Slip op. at 6-7.

Last Monday, October 20, the Judge Advocate General of the Army certified the case to CAAF:

No. 15-0112/AR. U.S. v. Tahir L. MUWWAKKIL. CCA 20140536. Notice is hereby given that a certificate for review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals on appeal by the United States under Article 62, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 862, and a supporting brief were filed under Rule 22, together with a motion to stay the proceedings on this 20th day of October, 2014, on the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE U.S. ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF BOTH THE FEDERAL JENCKS ACT (18 U.S.C. § 3500) AND RULE FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 914.

II. WHETHER THE U.S. ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DEFERENCE TO THE MILITARY JUDGE’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, AS SHE FAILED TO CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CASE, AND INSTEAD MADE A PRESUMPTION OF HARM BEFORE ORDERING AN EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY. SEE, e.g., KILLIAN v. UNITED STATES, 368 U.S. 231 (1961).

On consideration thereof, it is ordered that the motion to stay proceedings is hereby granted. Appellee will file an answer to the certified issues under Rule 22(b)(1) on or before October 30, 2014

While this is an interesting case on its own facts, the second certified issue is really interesting because it seems to be an attempt to reach outside the normal abuse of discretion standard that CAAF employs when it reviews the underlying ruling of the military judge in an interlocutory appeal. See United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, __, slip op. at 10-11 (C.A.A.F. Feb. 20, 2014) (CAAFlog case page) (“In an Article 62, UCMJ, petition, this Court reviews the military judge’s decision directly and reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial. . .”).

As for the Government’s concern about a presumption of harm, I’ll be interested to see how CAAF applies United States v. Jarrie, 5 M.J. 193, 195 (C.M.A. 1978) (“It suffices to say that, in the present case, the requested materials were not preserved for the record as required by 18 U.S.C s 3500(c) . This factor alone distinguishes it from those cases cited by the Court of Military Review as support for the application of the harmless error rule.”)