The Joint Travel Regulations (JTR) (formerly the JFTR) (available here) authorize reimbursement for travel performed on behalf of the Government, including travel to testify at a court-martial. See JTR, Appendix E1. Such reimbursement may include travel by an escort or attendant who accompanies the primary traveler when the traveler is, generally, “incapable of traveling alone.” JTR ¶ 7170 A.1.

But the Department of Defense recently expanded the circumstances where an escort or attendant is authorized to include any travel performed by:

a sexual assault victim who must travel to testify or participate (e.g., as a witness at a court martial or Article 32 hearing, pre-trial interviews, other hearing or panel (including Congressional)) in connection with the sexual assault.

The policy memorandum is available here.

I think the necessity and wisdom of this policy is dubious. My read of the pre-existing policy is that it allowed an authorizing official to determine that the traveler (including an alleged victim) cannot travel alone, and then authorize an escort or attendant. But the new policy singles out a sexual assault victim (without defining the term) for special treatment, and it does so in an incredibly broad range of circumstances.

So, for example, a person who alleges that a service member slapped their buttocks with the intent to humiliate them (a sexual contact as defined by Article 120(g)(2)(A)) “is authorized an escort or attendant” under the new policy without a showing of need. In contrast, a person who is the victim of an attempted murder by a service member, or the surviving family members of a murder victim’s family, must demonstrate need to justify not traveling alone.

There is a growing chorus of voices describing the military sexual assault response system as a victim-producing industry. I think this new policy lends support to those claims. For that reason, I think the new policy unwise.

Last week CAAF granted review of the following issue in an Army case:

No. 15-0476/AR. U.S. v. Eric L. Rapert. CCA 20130309.  On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:


Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

In Elonis (link to slip op.), the Supreme Court reversed a civilian defendant’s conviction of four counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which criminalizes using “any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.” At trial, Elonis asked for a jury instruction that would have required the Government to prove that he intended to communicate a true threat. The judge refused to give that instruction, and instead instructed the jury that the Government need only prove that a reasonable person would have foreseen that the statements would be interpreted as a threat. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Writing for the Court and reversing the Third Circuit, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that:

The jury was instructed that the Government need prove only that a reasonable person would regard Elonis’s communications as threats, and that was error. Federal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state.

Slip op. at 16.

I can’t find an opinion in Rapert on the Army CCA’s website, so I assume that the court summarily affirmed the conviction. But communicating a threat is an Article 134 offense, meaning that the basis for criminal liability is not that a threat was communicated, but rather that the circumstances were prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting. See MCM, Part IV, ¶ 110. For Rapert, a footnote in a recent CAAF opinion looms large:

From start to finish, the contested issue in the case was whether Appellant’s conduct met the terminal element of Article 134, UCMJ. Appellant argued that his conduct was insufficient to meet the terminal element, in part, because, in his view, his conduct would be constitutionally protected in a non-military setting. The trier of fact disagreed, and the ACCA concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient. What amounts to an argument that the Government has not put forth legally sufficient evidence to support an Article 134, UCMJ, conviction is fundamentally different from a constitutional argument that, in the military context, Appellant’s conduct is protected.

United States v. Goings, 72 M.J. 202, 205 n.3 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (CAAFlog case page).

This week at SCOTUS: The cert petition in Buford was added to the September 28 conference. I’m not aware of any other military justice developments at the Supreme Court, where I’m tracking one case:

This week at CAAF: The first oral argument date for CAAF’s September 2015 Term is October 6, 2015.

This week at the ACCA: The Army CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

This week at the AFCCA: The Air Force CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

This week at the CGCCA: The Coast Guard Trial Docket shows no scheduled oral arguments at the Coast Guard CCA.

This week at the NMCCA: The Navy-Marine Corps CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

CAAF’s daily journal was just updated to show that on Tuesday the court denied two significant petitions for extraordinary writs.

The first was a petition from an alleged victim in an ongoing court-martial. I discussed the petition in a post titled: An alleged victim seeks extraordinary relief from CAAF.

No. 15-0606/MC. CB v. Moira Modzelewski, Captain, U.S. Navy, in her official capacity as Military Judge, Appellee, and Donald Foster, Lance Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps, Real Party in Interest. CCA 201500058. On consideration of the writ-appeal petition, Appellant’s motion for a stay of trial court proceedings, and the motion of Amicus Curiae Protect Our Defenders to file a proposed brief out of time, the motion of Amicus Curiae Protect Our Defenders to file a proposed brief out of time is hereby granted; Appellant’s motion for a stay of trial court proceedings is hereby denied; and Appellant’s writ-appeal petition is hereby denied.

The second was a petition from Sergeant Bergdahl that I discussed in a post titled: Bergdahl seeks extraordinary relief.

No. 15-0616/AR. Robert B. Bergdahl v. Mark R. Milley, General, U.S. Army, in his official capacity as Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command and General Court-Martial Convening Authority. CCA20150383.  On consideration of the writ-appeal petition, and the motions filed by Alfredo N. Foster, Jr., Esq., and Franklin D. Rosenblatt, Esq., to appear pro hac vice, said motions are granted. The writ-appeal petition is hereby denied without prejudice to Appellant’s right to raise the issue asserted during the course of normal appellate review.

Notably, in the Bergdahl petition, CAAF granted the government an extension of time to file an answer to the petition, even though the government requested the extension after the deadline to file the answer had already passed (discussed here).

CAAF decided the Army case of United States v. Murphy, __ M.J. __, No. 14-0767/AR (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.), on Wednesday, July 8, 2015. Holding that ammunition is an explosive as the term is defined in the Manual for Courts-Martial, CAAF affirms the appellant’s pleas of guilty to larceny and conspiracy to sell military 5.56mm ammunition with the aggravating factor that the ammunition was an explosive, and also affirms the published decision of the Army CCA.

Judge Ryan writes for the court, joined by all but Judge Erdmann who concurs in the result.

The appellant pleaded guilty to offenses that included larceny and conspiracy to sell military 5.56 mm ammunition. Wrongful sale of military property (in violation of Article 108) and larceny (in violation of Article 121) have a range of maximum punishments depending on the existence of potential aggravating factors. One such factor is whether the object of the sale or larceny is an explosive. The charges against the appellant alleged that the 5.56 mm ammunition was an explosive, the appellant accepted that the ammunition was an explosive, and the Army CCA affirmed that conclusion in a published and en banc, but non-unanimous, opinion (discussed here).

CAAF then granted review of the following issue:

Whether the Army Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that ammunition constitutes an explosive for purposes of the sentence aggravator of Articles 108 and 121, UCMJ.

Judge Ryan’s opinion explains that the appellant “stole, in aggregate, approximately 5000 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition. Appellant alleges that there is a substantial basis in law to question the providence of his plea because ammunition is not an explosive within the meaning of either R.C.M. 103(11), or MCM pt. IV, para. 46.e.(1)(c), and because the definition of ‘explosive’ given by the military judge rendered the plea improvident.” Slip op. at 6-7. But CAAF finds no such basis to disturb the plea, with the majority concluding that:

because the definition of explosives in R.C.M. 103(11) includes ammunition and Appellant described all the facts necessary to establish his guilt.

Slip op. at 7.

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CAAF decided the Air Force case of United States v. McIntosh, __ M.J. __, No. 14-0685/AF (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.), on Wednesday, July 8, 2015. The court rejects the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that there was a tactical reason for the appellant’s defense team to not seek the admission of sexual assault examination reports. CAAF affirms the decision of the AFCCA and the appellant’s child sexual assault convictions.

Judge Stucky writes for a unanimous court.

CAAF granted review to determine:

Whether Appellant received ineffective assistance when defense counsel failed to introduce evidence which strongly corroborated the defense theory that the allegations in this case were false.

Appellant was convicted contrary to his pleas of not guilty, by a general court-martial composed members with enlisted representation, of rape of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, assault with the intent to commit rape, and of communicating a threat, in violation of Articles 120 and 134. He was sentenced to confinement for 25 years, reduction to E-1, total forfeitures, and a dishonorable discharge. The child subject of the allegations was Appellant step-daughter, and the charges alleged assaults from 2005 to 2010.

The prosecution’s case was based on witness testimony and not physical evidence. But there were sexual assault examinations conducted in 2007 and 2010 that indicated that the child’s “genitalia were ‘without abnormality’ (2007 SANE report) and ‘normal’ (2010 SANE report).” Slip op. at 4. The results of these examinations were not admitted into evidence by either side, and the appellant asserted on appeal that his counsel’s failure to admit them constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellant based his claim on the argument that “the reports are especially exculpatory in that they showed the victim’s hymen to be intact at both times and because they ‘bookended’ the period of rape and sexual assault.” Slip op. at 4.

The Air Force CCA rejected this claim, concluding that there are reasonable explanations for the defense decision to not seek admission of the reports. In yesterday’s opinion, CAAF agrees.

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Today the Joint Service Committee published this notice in the Federal Register, updating numerous discussion sections in the Manual for Courts-Martial, as well as the analysis in Appendix 22 and 23, to reflect recent changes to the substantive rules (discussed here). 

Notably, the notice does not publish an executive order making these changes. Rather, it is an independent action by the JSC. This is a departure from the relatively recent practice of publishing amendments to the discussion and analysis sections alongside the actual executive orders signed by the President. However, it accords with the self-described non-binding nature of those materials:

The Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, has published supplementary materials to accompany the Manual for Courts-Martial. These materials consist of a Discussion (accompanying the Preamble, the Rules for Courts-Martial, and the Punitive Articles), an Analysis, and various appendices. These supplementary materials do not constitute the official views of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the military departments, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, or any other authority of the Government of the United States, and they do not constitute rules.

MCM (2012 ed.), Part I, ¶ 4 (discussion).

For those who aren’t following the significance of this, read on.

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CAAF decided the Air Force case of United States v. Nettles, __ M.J. __, No. 14-0754/AF (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.), on Monday, July 6, 2015. Declining to apply the requirement for physical delivery of a discharge certificate to reservists not on active duty, CAAF concludes that the appellant was validly discharged on the effective date of his self-executing discharge orders and was not subject to trial by court-martial, despite the fact that his command attempted to retain him in a military status pending trial. The court reverses the decision of the Air Force CCA and the appellant’s sexual offense convictions, and dismisses the charges.

Judge Stucky writes for a unanimous court.

CAAF granted review of a single issue in this case:

Whether the Air Force had personal jurisdiction over Appellant at the time of his trial.

In 2013 the appellant (a captain in the Air Force Reserve) was convicted contrary to his pleas of not guilty, by a general court-martial composed of officer members, of two specifications of conspiracy to commit indecent acts, one specification of conduct unbecoming an officer by engaging in sexual intercourse in the presence of a third person, and a second specification of conduct unbecoming an officer by engaging in sexual intercourse and sodomy in the presence of a third person (he was acquitted of an allegation of rape). He was sentenced to confinement for two months, a reprimand, and to be dismissed.

The charges related to events that occurred in May 2007, while the appellant was on active duty. Three months later, in August 2007, the appellant left active duty and entered the Air Force Reserve. Nearly five years later, in March 2012, he was notified that he was twice passed over for promotion to major and, as a result, was to be separated from the reserves on October 1, 2012, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 14505.

But in May 2012, the appellant was charged with the offenses at issue. Because of the charges:

The Secretary of the Air Force approved the recall of Appellant to active duty for the purposes of court-martial on July 18, 2012. The special court-martial convening authority’s staff judge advocate asked the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) to place an administrative hold on Appellant so that he would not be discharged from the service, but the ARPC never did so. Accordingly, a discharge order was generated on September 25, 2012, with an effective date of October 1, 2012.

Slip op. at 2. However, the discharge order was never formally delivered to the appellant because of a shortage of a special card stock used to print an accompanying certificate. Then, “in early November, 2012, the convening authority learned of the erroneously generated order, contacted ARPC, and ARPC rescinded the prior discharge order.” Slip op. at 3.

CAAF’s jurisprudence generally requires three things in order for a discharge to sever personal jurisdiction for a court-martial:

(1) a delivery of a valid discharge certificate; (2) a final accounting of pay; and (3) the undergoing of a “clearing” process as required under appropriate service regulations to separate the member from military service.

Slip op. at 3-4 (quoting United States v. Harmon, 63 M.J. 98, 101 (C.A.A.F. 2006)). These requirements are “based on a civil personnel statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1168(a) (2012).” Slip op. at 4 (citing United States v. Hart, 66 M.J. 273, 275 (C.A.A.F. 2008)). The delivery requirement is at issue in this case. However, delivery cannot “be effective if it is contrary to expressed command intent.” Slip op. at 4. Further, delivery generally requires “actual physical receipt” of the discharge. Slip op. at 5. Under the facts of the case, neither command intent nor actual receipt favor the appellant.

But CAAF “decline[s] to employ the 10 U.S.C. § 1168(a) framework here.” Slip op. at 5.

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I noted the petition for review in the Marine Corps case United States v. Sterling, No. 15-0510/MC, in this post. The case asserts a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in the application of a military order.

Friend of CAAFlog Don Rehkoph forwards the Government’s answer to the petition for grant of review (available here), as well as an amicus brief he authored on behalf of the Military Religious Freedom Foundation and in support of neither party (available here). Both briefs argue that CAAF should deny review.

Last week CAAF granted review in the following case:

No. 15-0425/AF. U.S. v. Alan J. Killion, Jr. CCA S32193.  On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issues:



Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

The CCA’s opinion is available here and reveals that the appellant’s conviction for using provoking speech in violation of Article 134 was based on the following events:

After a night of excessive drinking, the appellant became belligerent and disorderly, accosting strangers with profane outbursts and resisting his friend’s efforts to convince him to return home. Instead, the appellant jumped a fence and entered the apartment of a noncommissioned officer (NCO) he did not know, frightening the residents and neighbors who called security forces. The appellant was apprehended and evaluated on scene by emergency medical technicians who decided to transport him to the base emergency room.

Once there, while undergoing treatment for his altered mental state and injuries to his wrist and knee, the appellant lashed out at the medical providers both physically and verbally. Struggling against restraint by two security forces members and the medical staff, he verbally accosted several medical providers, calling one female nurse a “c[**]t” and medical technicians “Asian douchebags” and “ch[*]nk.” This continued intermittently for over an hour, ending only after the medical staff determined it was necessary to sedate him.

United States v. Killion, No 32193, slip op. at 2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2015) (marks in original). The CCA rejected both of the issues granted by CAAF, and also rejected an as-applied constitutional challenge (raised on appeal for the first time) based on the appellant’s assertion that his speech was not fighting words. The asserted instructional error addresses a tailored instruction offered by the defense that would have had the members review the appellant’s speech subjectively: considering “the occupation, education, and training of the listener” to determine whether the listener would be provoked by the speech. Id., slip op. at 4.

This week at SCOTUS: The SG waived the right to respond to the cert petition in Buford v. United States, No. 14-601. See United States v. Buford, 74 M.J. 98 (C.A.A.F. Mar. 24, 2015) (CAAFlog case page).

I’m not aware of any other military justice developments at the Supreme Court.

This week at CAAF: The first oral argument date for CAAF September 2015 Term is on October 6, 2015.

This week at the ACCA: The Army CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

This week at the AFCCA: The Air Force CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

This week at the CGCCA: The Coast Guard Trial Docket shows no scheduled oral arguments at the Coast Guard CCA.

This week at the NMCCA: The Navy-Marine Corps CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

CAAF decied the certified Air Force case of United States v. Katso, __ M.J. __, No. 14-5008/AF (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.), on Tuesday, June 30, 2015. CAAF holds that the testimony of an expert witness did not violate the appellee’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, reversing the published decision of the Air Force CCA and remanding the case for further proceedings.

Judge Ryan writes for the court, joined by all but Judge Ohlson, who dissents.

The published opinion of the Air Force CCA provides the following facts:

While celebrating her 21st birthday with several friends, Senior Airman (SrA) CA became intoxicated after consuming between 15 and 20 drinks over the course of the evening. At an off-base bar and unable to return to the base on her own, she was assisted back to her room and fell asleep on her bed. SrA CA testified that she woke up when she felt “someone having sex with [her].” She said she was attacked by someone wearing denim pants, glasses, a beanie cap, and a coat. After SrA CA struggled against him, her assailant left, and SrA CA ran into another room and told a friend she had been raped. SrA CA subsequently identified [appellee] as her attacker.

United States v. Katso, 73 M.J. 630, __, slip op. at 2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2014). DNA samples were collected from both SrA CA and the appellee. The samples were sent to the United States Army Criminal Investigations Laboratory (USACIL) for analysis, where a forensic examiner named Mr. Fisher conducted an examination and produced a report that showed a match between the appellee’s DNA profile and semen found in the samples taken from CA. In accordance with USACIL procedure, Mr. Fisher’s report was then reviewed by a second examiner, Mr. Davenport.

The Government intended to call Mr. Fisher to testify at trial about the DNA results, but he was unavailable due to a family emergency. So the Government offered the expert testimony of Mr. Davenport instead. Mr. Davenport testified over the objection of the Defense, which objected on confrontation grounds. The military judge overruled the Defense objection, ruling that Mr. Davenport could testify about his independent findings. But a three-judge panel of the Air Force CCA unanimously concluded that Mr. Davenport improperly repeated testimonial hearsay from Mr. Fisher during his trial testimony, and that this violated the appellee’s right to confrontation. The panel then split 2-1 to find that error prejudicial, reversed the convictions, and authorized a rehearing.

The Government certified the case to CAAF, with the following issue:

Whether the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it found Appellee’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the military judge permitted, over Defense objection, the testimony of the Government’s DNA expert, and that the error was not harmless

CAAF now reinstates the appellee’s convictions of aggravated sexual assault, burglary, and unlawful entry. Judge Ryan’s majority opinion conducts a detailed Confrontation Clause analysis of the testimony of Mr. Davenport, however her ultimate conclusions are solidly based on CAAF’s own precedent. Specifically, as Judge Ryan explains:

In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, we are bound, within the constraints discernible from controlling precedent, to provide a clear rule for the military justice system. Fortunately, we already have a rule. This Court’s precedent makes clear that even when an expert relies in part upon “statements” by an out-of-court declarant, the admissibility of the expert’s opinion hinges on the degree of independent analysis the expert undertook in order to arrive at that opinion. Blazier II, 69 M.J. at 224-25.

Slip op. at 24. Applying this clear rule, Judge Ryan concludes:

Experts may “review and rely upon the work of others, including laboratory testing conducted by others, so long as they reach their own opinions in conformance with evidentiary rules regarding expert opinions.” Blazier II, 69 M.J. at 224. That is precisely what happened here.

Slip op. at 25.

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Both the Senate and the House have passed versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 that contain numerous military justice provisions. The Senate was last to act (passing its version on June 18), and the House has requested a conference to resolve the differences.

I’ve excerpted the military justice sections of both bills into separate documents. The House version is available here. The Senate version is available here.

Notable sections include:

  • Section 546 of the Senate version, changing the corroboration rule for confessions to require only corroboration of the trustworthiness of the confession rather than corroboration of the actual matters confessed. The corroboration rule (and its requirement for corroboration of facts rather than truthiness) was at issue this term in United States v. Adams, 74 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F. Apr. 27, 2015) (CAAFlog case page).
  • Section 557 of the House version, requiring establishment of a database to track all service members – current and former – who have been convicted of a sex offense at a court-martial, for the purpose of ensuring that they are properly registered as a sex offender.
  • Section 549 of the Senate version, permitting an alleged victim to file an interlocutory appeal of certain issues, requiring a CCA to conduct a de novo review of those issues, and requiring the CCA to issue its decision within 72 hours of the filing of the petition.
  • Section 551 of the Senate version, granting an alleged victim a right to Special Victims’ Counsel during questioning by military criminal investigators, but specifically stating that a violation of the right shall not be a basis to suppress any statement given by an alleged victim.
  • Sections 546 and 1159 of the House version, which would require that a victim be allowed to participate in nonjudicial punishment and administrative separation proceedings.
  • Section 548 of the House version, adding a mandatory minimum 2 year period of confinement to the mandatory minimum dishonorable discharge for certain sex offenses.
  • Section 556 of the House version, requiring public access to court-martial documents at all stages of the proceedings.
  • Various provisions in both bills expanding the scope of the role of Special Victims’ Counsel.

Last term, in the companion cases of United States v. McPherson, 73 M.J. 393 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 21, 2014) (CAAFlog case page), and United States v. Wilson, 73 M.J. 404 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 21, 2014) (CAAFlog case page), CAAF held that the Article 12 prohibition against confining service members in immediate association with non-service member aliens applies when a service member is confined in a civilian facility within the United States. CAAF also held that a service member must exhaust all administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief for a violation of that prohibition. CAAF then denied relief in both cases, holding in McPherson that the appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and finding no violation of Article 12 in Wilson because the appellant was confined alone.

Notably, both cases were certified to CAAF by the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force in order to define the reach of Article 12 (in part because of the Air Force relies heavily on civilian confinement facilities). And a curious twist to Wilson was that the appellant never asserted a violation of Article 12. Rather, he asserted that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth Amendment, because he was segregated from other inmates while confined in a civilian facility (presumably to avoid any Article 12 issue).

The Air Force CCA rejected Wilson’s claims for relief (twice). But now that CCA revisits the issue raised in Wilson. In United States v. Gay, __ M.J. __, No. 38525 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jun. 12, 2015) (link to slip op.), the AFCCA holds that the appellant’s confinement in solitary confinement (where he was alone 23 hours per day, and suffered other administrative hardships) in a civilian facility, imposed after he complained of an Article 12 violation, was not cruel and unusual punishment, but is deserving of relief under the CCA’s Article 66(c) sentence-appropriateness power.

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This week at SCOTUS: A cert petition was filed last week in Buford v. United States, No. 14-601. In United States v. Buford, 74 M.J. 98 (C.A.A.F. Mar. 24, 2015) (CAAFlog case page), an interlocutory Government appeal, a divided CAAF held that the military judge wrongly concluded that an active duty Air Force Security Forces member was acting as a Government agent when he collected evidence related to the case.

I’m not aware of any other military justice developments at the Supreme Court.

This week at CAAF: CAAF has posted its oral argument dates for the September 2015 Term of Court:

October 2015: 6, 7, 20, 21, 27, 28
November 2015: 17, 18
December 2015: 15, 16
January 2016: 12, 13, 26, 27
February 2016: 10, 23, 24
March 2016: 15, 16
April 2016: 5, 6, 26, 27
May 2016: 10, 11

This week at the ACCA: The Army CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

This week at the AFCCA: The Air Force CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

This week at the CGCCA: The Coast Guard Trial Docket shows no scheduled oral arguments at the Coast Guard CCA.

This week at the NMCCA: The Navy-Marine Corps CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments