CAAF decided the Army case of United States v. Turner, __ M.J. __, No. 19-0158/AR (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.), on Wednesday, March 25, 2020. Considering a specification of attempted murder that failed to expressly allege that the attempt was unlawful (a necessary term because military service involves lawful killing), a majority of the court reads the specification with maximum liberality because the defense waited until after findings to object, and affirms the conviction and the decision of the Army CCA.

Judge Ohlson writes for the court, joined by all but Judge Maggs, who dissents.

CAAF granted review to determine:

Whether the specification of Charge I alleging an attempted killing fails to state an offense because it does not explicitly, or by necessary implication, allege the attempted killing was unlawful.

Specialist (E-4) Turner was charged with a specification that read:

that, Specialist Malcolm R. Turner, U.S. Army, did, at or near Clarksville, Tennessee, on or about 1 January 2015, attempt to kill with premeditation Specialist [C.SG.] by means of shooting her with a loaded firearm, causing grievous bodily injury.

The charge arose from a violent encounter involving Turner, his wife, and a the victim. Turner served with the victim in Korea, and Turner had an adulterous relationship with her that ended when she learned he was married. The victim later learned that she was pregnant, gave birth, and sought child support from Turner. In 2015, Turner and his wife drove from Colorado to Tennessee to confront the victim. During the confrontation, Turner shot the victim multiple times. He was ultimately convicted of attempted murder (the specification at issue), conspiracy to commit premeditated murder, maiming, and obstruction of justice, and sentenced to confinement for life without the possibility of parole, reduction to E-1, total forfeitures, and a dishonorable discharge. The Army CCA reversed the obstruction conviction (as factually insufficient) and conditionally dismissed the maiming charge, but affirmed the other findings and affirmed the sentence.

During the court-martial, Turner’s defense counsel objected to the attempted murder specification as failing to state an offense. However, counsel did not do so until after the members found Turner guilty. CAAF does not explicitly say that the delay was for purely tactical reasons, but it does suggest as much with a footnote quoting the Ninth Circuit’s observation that “delay in raising the issue suggests a purely tactical motivation of incorporating a convenient ground of appeal in the event the jury verdict went against the defendants.” Slip op. at 9 n.7 (citation omitted). That’s problematic because CAAF’s precedent strongly favors earlier objections, even though the Rules for Courts-Martial do not require an earlier objection to the failure of a specification to state an offense (something Judge Maggs highlights in his dissenting opinion). Specifically, when a specification is challenged at trial, CAAF reads the specification narrowly; but when it is first challenged after trial, it is read with “maximum liberality.” Slip op. at 7.

The result in this case turns on the majority’s conclusion that the defense objection was made after trial, and so the maximum liberality standard applies and the conviction is affirmed. Judge Ohlson’s majority opinion does not explicitly say that an earlier objection would have led to a different result, but it strongly implies that. Judge Maggs’ dissenting opinion, however, is clear that the specification fails under a narrow reading:

I agree with the Court’s implication that apart from the “maximum liberality” standard, the specification fails to allege criminality either expressly or by necessary implication.

Diss. op. at 3. In other words, Turner’s conviction of attempted murder is based on a deficient specification, but the conviction is affirmed because Turner’s defense counsel waited until after findings to object.

Judge Ohlson explains that the military is a notice-pleading jurisdiction where “each specification will be found constitutionally sufficient only if it alleges, either expressly or by necessary implication, every element of the offense, so as to give the accused notice of the charge against which he must defend and protect him against double jeopardy.” Slip op. at 4 (marks and citations omitted). If a specification fails to state an offense, the remedy is dismissal unless the Government can show that the deficiency was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Whether a specification fails to state an offense, however, “depend[s] on when counsel first raised the issue.” Id. Judge Ohlson writes:

“[W]hen [a] charge and specification are first challenged at trial, we read the wording . .. narrowly and will only adopt interpretations that hew closely to the plain text.” United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J . 225, 230 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (emphasis added). Hewing closely to the plain text means we will consider only the language contained in the specification when deciding whether it properly states the offense in question. See United States v. Sutton, 68 M.J . 455 (C.A.A.F. 2010). However, “[a] flawed specification first challenged after trial . . . is viewed with greater tolerance than one which was attacked before findings and sentence.” United States v. Watkins, 21 M.J. 208,209 (C.M.A. 1986) (emphasis added). Under the latter scenario, the specification will be viewed with “maximum liberality.” United States v. Bryant, 30 M.J. 72, 73 (C.M.A. 1990).

Slip op. at 4.

In this case the issue was first raised after findings but before the court-martial adjourned. The majority finds that after findings is after trial, because:

In actuality, the line of demarcation that separates the “trial” stage of a court-martial and the “after trial” stage of a court-martial is the moment of time “before findings and sentence.” Watkins, 21 M.J. at 209 (emphasis added). Thus, as soon as the finder of fact announces a guilty verdict regarding the facially deficient specification, the trial has ended, and the “liberal construction” and “greater tolerance” standards apply. Id.; Bryant, 30 M.J. at 75.

Slip op. at 8. That holding is bolstered by federal civilian practice, with Judge Ohlson writing:

The federal circuit courts’ distinction between ”before conviction” and before verdict,” versus “after conviction” and “after verdict” is significant. In the civilian federal court system there almost always is a considerable lapse of time between when the government obtains a verdict convicting a defendant, and when the defendant’s sentencing occurs (and, of course, when an appeal is filed). Thus, the temporal distinction referenced by several other federal circuit courts is a bright line; in order for a defendant to receive the benefit of a more favorable analytical standard, the defendant must raise a claim that the indictment failed to state an offense before he is convicted. The Watkins Court clearly chose to adopt this approach-which, in the military context, means before findings are announced-and we hold that this analysis serves as  binding precedent here.

Slip op. at 9. A footnote adds that this interpretation avoids sandbagging, which the court strongly suggests occurred in this case:

This temporal distinction removes any incentive for trial defense counsel to wait until the verdict is announced before playing the “failure to state an offense” card. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit noted as much when it explained the rationale behind the rule in Pheaster: “Such a long delay in raising the issue suggests a purely tactical motivation of incorporating a convenient ground of appeal in the event the jury verdict went against the defendants.” 544 F.2d at 361.

Slip op. at 9 n.7.

Having found that the objection came after trial, the majority views the specification with maximum liberality, which Judge Ohlson explains means that:

the claim will fail “absent a clear showing of substantial prejudice to the accused such as a showing that the indictment is ‘so obviously defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense for which conviction was had.'”

Slip op. at 10 (quoting Watkins, 21 M.J. at 210 (quoting United States v. Thompson, 356 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir. 1965)). Turner cannot overcome that high bar because a reasonable construction of the language of the specification necessarily implies an unlawful killing, and because “there simply is no prejudice to be found in this case.” Slip op. at 10-11.

Jduge Maggs broadly agrees with the majority opinion, including agreeing that the objection was not barred by the Rules for Courts-Martial, that the specification would fail without application of the maximum liberality standard, and that the specification survives with the maximum liberality standard. However, Judge Maggs would not apply that standard to this case, for three reasons. “First, nothing in the Rules for Courts-Martial suggests that a different standard of assessing the sufficiency of a specification should apply depending on whether an accused objects to a specification before or after findings.” Diss. op. at 4. “Second, no precedent requires us to apply the “maximum liberality” standard in this case.” Diss. op. at 5. “Third, this Court should not expand the situations in which the “maximum liberality” standard applies.” Diss. op. at 5. He concludes:

R.C.M. 907(b)(l)(B) and R.C.M. 905(e) permit the accused to challenge a specification for failing to state an offense at any stage of the proceedings, and R.C.M. 307(c)(3) establishes the test for assessing such challenges. We therefore have no need to borrow different standards from other federal courts.

Diss. op. at 5-6. Judge Maggs also acknowledges that the majority’s application of the maximum liberality standard might be good policy, but that making such policy is not (or, at least, should not be) CAAF’s role. He would, therefore, reverse the conviction of attempted murder and set aside the sentence.

Case Links:
ACCA opinion
Blog post: CAAF grants review
Appellant’s brief
Appellee’s (Gov’t Div.) brief
Appellant’s reply brief
Blog post: Argument preview
• Oral argument audio (wma)(mp3)
CAAF opinion
Blog post: Opinion analysis

15 Responses to “Opinion Analysis: An objection delayed is an objection denied, in United States v. Turner”

  1. Charlie Gittins says:

    So, the lesson from this case is make the objection to the specification before closing arguments.

  2. Nathan Freeburg says:

    Why not at the same time as the 917 — after the panel goes back to deliberate?

  3. stewie says:

    But then you couldn’t hope for the acquittal making it moot before you object.

  4. Nathan Freeburg says:

    Maybe. If you do it during deliberations is the judge going to call them back out to announce the charge is dismissed?  Or wait until they come out with findings. I suspect usually the latter. 

  5. Tami a/k/a Princess Leia says:

    A motion to dismiss for failure to state an offense is different than a motion for a finding of not guilty.  A successful motion for a finding of not guilty can’t be appealed.
    I agree the appropriate time for a MTD for failure to state an offense, after this case, should be during deliberations.
    I disagree that “after trial” means “after verdict.”  Considering that the rules permit a MTD for failure to state an offense can be made at any time until adjournment, “after trial” should be “after adjournment.”  If the government fails to state an offense but doesn’t figure it out until after findings, well, that’s smart lawyering by a defense counsel.  It’s not “sandbagging,” it’s a defense counsel’s maximum protection of the client’s rights against double jeopardy.

  6. Brian says:

    RCM 908(a) was amended to follow federal practice, and allow the government to appeal a not guilty RCM 917 ruling by the judge, if it is entered after members return a guilty verdict.  

  7. Zachary D Spilman says:

    It’s not “sandbagging,” it’s a defense counsel’s maximum protection of the client’s rights against double jeopardy.

    Considering that no jeopardy attaches to a specification that fails to state an offense (for the obvious reason), I think it’s just sandbagging.

  8. Vulture says:

    No manifestation of authority would fail to invoke itself so we must not be rewarded for failing to contend with it.

  9. AnnoyingProle says:

    Why couldn’t the appropriate time be the one directed under the TMO?  Was that an option?

  10. Nathan Freeburg says:

    You must be Navy/Marine.  Army case so it would have been a PTO.  Assuming it specified a date for motions it still would have been IAC, IMO, to actually have copied with that date for this specific motion.

  11. Nathan Freeburg says:

    Navy/Marine Corps:  Trial Management Order
    Army: PreTrial Order
    Air Force: Scheduling Order

  12. stewie says:

    Space Force: Order 66

  13. Fisch says:

    I thought PTO meant ‘Personal Time Off.’  No wonder detailed counsel freaked out when I sent the Judge an e-mail saying I was going to Vermont for a week on the date motions were due.  Been a civilian way too long.

  14. Philip D. Cave says:

    Can’t we even have a Uniform List of Acronyms across the Services?

  15. Tami a/k/a Princess Leia says:

    Excuse me, sir. Seeing as how the VP is such a VIP, shouldn’t we keep the PC on the QT? ‘Cause if it leaks to the VC he could end up MIA, and then we’d all be put on KP

Leave a Reply