Earlier this year, in United States v. Briggs, 78 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. Feb. 22, 2019) (CAAFlog case page), CAAF applied last term’s decision in United States v. Mangahas, 77 M.J. 220 (C.A.A.F. Feb. 6, 2018) (CAAFlog case page), and held that the 2006 amendment to the statute of limitations for the offense of rape was not retroactive. Accordingly, CAAF reversed a rape conviction from 2014 based on an allegation dating to 2005.
The Solicitor General has received an extension of time – until June 22, 2019 – to seek certiorari of CAAF’s decision. In a motion filed on May 10 and available here, the SG asserted:
The court [CAAF] stated that, under its decision in Mangahas, the UCMJ at the time of respondent’s offense in 2005 “established a five-year period of limitations,” id. at 5a, and the court concluded that the 2006 amendment to the UCMJ expressly eliminating any limitations period for rape charges did not apply, id. at 6a-10a. The court viewed its precedent to require treating the issue as a question of retroactivity; applied presumptions disfavoring the amendment’s application; and refused to find those presumptions overcome. See ibid. The court rejected the government’s contention that applying the 2006 amendment would not actually be a “‘retroactive’ 5 application of the law because the 2006 amendment did not attach any new legal obligations on” respondent, as well as its contention that Congress intended the 2006 amendment to apply to cases like respondent’s because it was simply codifying the CAAF’s then-extant decisions in Stebbins and Willenbring, id. at 8a-10a. The CAAF also rejected the government’s contention that respondent had relinquished the limitations defense by failing to raise it at trial. Id. at 10a-12a.