In a very interesting published opinion in United States v. Bass, __ M.J. __, No. 201400229 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. May 27, 2015) (link to slip op.), a three judge panel of the NMCCA holds that the military judge erred in instructing the members on the offense of consensual sodomy in violation of Article 125 as a lesser included offense (LIO) of the offense of forcible sodomy in violation of Article 125 (the alleged offenses occurred before Article 125 was repealed and replaced in the FY14 NDAA). The CCA also holds that the judge did not err in instructing the members that they could use the charged sexual offenses as propensity evidence under Military Rule of Evidence 413 (a similar conclusion was recently reached by the Army CCA, as discussed here). The NMCCA reverses the appellant’s convictions for consensual sodomy, sets aside the sentence, and orders a sentence rehearing.

The appellant was charged with sexual assault of two female sailors, one of whom had a prior consensual relationship with the appellant. The appellant was convicted contrary to his pleas of not guilty, by a general court-martial composed of member with enlisted representation, of sexual harassment and wrongful sexual contact involving one of the sailors, and of consensual sodomy (as a LIO of forcible sodomy) involving the other sailor (the one with whom he had the prior relationship). The appellant was sentenced to confinement for seven years, total forfeitures, reduction to E-1, and a dishonorable discharge.

At trial, without objection from the appellant’s defense counsel, the military judge instructed the members that consensual sodomy is a LIO of forcible sodomy:

The lesser included offense of non-forcible sodomy differs from the charged offense of forcible sodomy, in that non-forcible sodomy does not require you to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the sodomy was committed by force and without the consent of the other person. However, in order to find the accused guilty of this lesser included offense, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt both that the physical act of sodomy occurred and that it involved public behavior; an act of prostitution; persons who might be injured, coerced or who were situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused; or of a unique military interest.

Slip op. at 5 (quoting record). But the NMCCA finds that this instruction was erroneous because a conviction of consensual sodomy requires aggravating factors that remove the sexual activity from the liberty interest identified by the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). CAAF identified those factors in United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004), and it held in United States v. Castellano, 72 M.J. 217 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (CAAFlog case page), that determining the existence of such Marcum factors is a matter for the trier of fact.

In Bass, the NMCCA applies Castellano to conclude that the aggravating factors must be stated in the specification:

The CAAF’s binding interpretation that Marcum factors represent additional facts necessary to prove a criminal act of sodomy——as opposed to factors to guide judges in making legal determinations——constrains us to conclude that, as a result, they must be pleaded in a sodomy specification.

Slip op. at 7.

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In a published opinion in United States v. Jeter, __ M.J. __, No. 38511 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jul. 1, 2015) (link to slip op.), a three judge panel of the AFCCA affirms a conviction for willfully damaging non-military property in violation of Article 109, holding that:

By definition, “damage” encompasses “physical injury to the property,” and we hereby construe “physical injury” to include the rendering of personal property at least temporarily useless for its intended purpose. When reading these concepts together, for purposes of Article 109, UCMJ, we find that “damage” consists of any physical injury to the property, to include any change to the condition of the personal property that renders it, at least temporarily, useless for its intended purpose.

Slip op. at 4. The facts of the case involve a very unhappy marriage, during which the appellant put sugar into the gas tank of his wife’s vehicle:

Suspecting the appellant had put sugar in her vehicle’s gas tank, his wife had her vehicle towed to an auto repair shop, where mechanics confirmed her suspicion. The service manager of the repair shop testified that sugar forms a gel-like substance when mixed with gasoline. If that substance passes through the vehicle’s fuel injectors, they will stick and prevent the car from running. The service manager testified that, at the time he removed the sugar from the vehicle’s tank, there had not yet been any physical injury to the vehicle itself, as the gel-like substance had not moved out of the gas tank. Until the sugar was removed, however, the vehicle could not be driven without causing physical injury to the vehicle. This raises the question whether sugar in the tank amounts to “damage” of the vehicle—nonmilitary property—within the meaning of Article 109, UCMJ. We conclude that it does.

Slip op. at 3-4.

Writing for the CCA, Chief Judge Allred explains that “the appellant’s placing sugar in the vehicle’s gas tank amounted to “damage” within the meaning of Article 109, UCMJ—as it changed the condition of the vehicle rendering it temporarily useless for its intended purpose.” Slip op. at  5.

This week at SCOTUS: I’m not aware of any military justice developments at the Supreme Court, where I’m tracking one case:

This week at CAAF: The first oral argument date for CAAF’s September 2015 Term is October 6, 2015.

This week at the ACCA: The Army CCA will hear oral argument in one case this week, Tuesday, July 28, 2015, at 10 a.m.:

United States v. Talar, No. 20130603

Issue: Whether the military judge abused her discretion in admitting prosecution exhibit nine containing testimonial hearsay from a declarant not present at trial in violation of Staff Sergeant Talar’s confrontation rights guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.

This week at the AFCCA: The Air Force CCA will hear oral argument in one case this week, on Tuesday, July 28, 2015, at 10 a.m. The issue indicates that the case is a Government appeal of the suppression of the results of a urinalysis based on the accused’s self-report of a substance abuse problem:

United States v. Catano

Issue: Whether the military judge erred when ruling that appellee self-identified his illegal drug use to his first sergeant, thereby protecting all statements he made about his illegal drug use and preventing a positive urinalysis from being used as evidence against him.

This week at the CGCCA: The Coast Guard CCA’s oral argument schedule shows no scheduled oral arguments at the Coast Guard CCA.

This week at the NMCCA: The Navy-Marine Corps CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

Sergeant Bergdahl has filed another writ-appeal petition at CAAF:

No. 15-0710/AR. Robert B. Bergdahl, Appellant v.  Peter Q. Burke, Lieutenant Colonel, AG, U.S. Army, in his official capacity as Commander, Special Troops Battalion, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, NC, and Special Court-Marital Convening Authority and United States, Appellees.  CCA 20150463.

Notice is hereby given that a writ-appeal petition for review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals on petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of quo warranto or other appropriate writ was filed under Rule 27(b) on this date.

Quo warranto means “by what authority.” A complete copy of the writ-appeal petition is available here.

The issue presented is:

Where the Secretary of the Army refers a report of offense to a general court-martial convening authority on the express condition that he “may not further delegate this authority,” may he nonetheless forward it to a subordinate commander for all purposes other than ultimate disposition?

The petition digs deep into the finer points of court-martial procedure, but I’m going to try my best to summarize it in plain English.

Read more »

In United States v. Blouin, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. Jun. 25, 2015) (CAAFlog case page), CAAF narrowly reversed the appellant’s pleas of guilty to possession of child pornography where the images involved non-nude depictions of minors. Writing for the majority, Judge Erdmann implicitly rejected the holding of United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d at 736, (3d Cir. 1994) (Knox II), and seemingly held that a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area must include an unclothed depiction of that area. However, this holding is a little unclear, since CAAF merely found the plea insufficient to sustain the conviction. But in doing so, CAAF reversed the published decision of the Army CCA that had affirmed the plea.

A trailer to Blouin has the potential to provide additional clarity. In United States v. Gould, No. 20120727 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2014) (link to slip op.), the Army CCA found that the appellant’s conviction for production of child pornography was legally sufficient, relying on its own decision in Blouin that CAAF later reversed. CAAF granted review in Gould in January (grant discussed here). But last week, the court summarily remanded the case for further consideration in light of Blouin:

No. 15-0129/AR. U.S. v. Orval W. Gould, Jr. CCA 20120727.  On further consideration of the granted issue, __ M.J.__ (Daily Journal January 21, 2015), and in light of United States v.Blouin, 74 M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2015), the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals as to Charge II and Specification 1 thereunder and the sentence is reversed.  The decision of that court as to the remaining charge and specification is affirmed.  The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for remand to that court for further consideration in light of Blouin.

The CCA’s opinion doesn’t provide much detail about the images at issue in Gould, but it does explain that the appellant was convicted contrary to his plea of not guilty. If the case involves only non-nude images alleged to constitute lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area, Gould should provide further clarity on whether such images are legally sufficient to constitute child pornography.

In a published opinion in United States v. Borden, __ M.J. __, No. 20130493 (Jul. 6, 2015) (link to slip op.), a three-judge panel of the Army CCA holds that:

[W]here the government elects to serve post-trial papers by certified mail, service of such papers is complete upon the day the papers arrive at an accused’s last known-address.

Slip op. at 6. The case is particularly interesting because it involves a soldier whose sentence included a bad-conduct discharge, but whose location was seemingly unknown to military authorities (the record was mailed to his excess leave address, but was never claimed). Because a punitive discharge may not be executed until appellate review is complete, the appellant was presumably still on active duty at the time of the service (though in a no-pay-due status).

The CCA’s conclusion that actual receipt is not necessary to accomplish actual service of the record of trial seems to give the Army a pass for losing track of the appellant’s whereabouts.

This week at SCOTUS: I’m not aware of any military justice developments at the Supreme Court, where I’m tracking one case:

This week at CAAF: The first oral argument date for CAAF’s September 2015 Term is October 6, 2015.

This week at the ACCA: The next scheduled oral argument at the Army CCA is on July 28, 2015.

This week at the AFCCA: The next scheduled oral argument at the Air Force CCA is on July 28, 2015.

This week at the CGCCA: The Coast Guard CCA’s oral argument schedule (new link) shows no scheduled oral arguments at the Coast Guard CCA.

This week at the NMCCA: The Navy-Marine Corps CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

In a published opinion in United States v. Pease, __ M.J. __, No. 201400165 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Jul. 14, 2015) (link to slip op.), the Navy-Marine Corps CCA reverses convictions for sexual assault and abusive sexual contact, finding that the Government failed to prove that the intoxicated victims were incapable of consenting and that the appellant knew or reasonably should have known that they were incapable of consenting.

The case involves two female victims: S.K. and B.S. Both were subordinates of the appellant, and both had (separate) sexual encounters with the appellant after drinking significant amounts of alcohol. The encounter with S.K. occurred in December 2012, and the encounter with B.S. occurred in January 2014. Both women had fragmentary memories of the encounters the mornings after. But the morning after her encounter with the appellant, B.S. was awoken by S.K., and:

IT2 B.S. told ITSN S.K. about what had transpired between her and the appellant. ITSN S.K. then relayed to IT2 B.S. what had happened between herself and the appellant the previous month. They decided IT2 B.S. should report she had been assaulted. After IT2 B.S. finished her report to a victim advocate, ITSN S.K., on IT2 B.S.’s urging, reported her alleged assault as well.

Slip op. at 9. The appellant was convicted contrary to his pleas of not guilty, by a general court-martial composed of members with enlisted representation, of fraternization in violation of Article 92 and of sexual assault and abusive sexual contact in violation of Article 120 (2012). He was sentenced to confinement for six years and a dishonorable discharge.

Writing for a three-judge panel of the NMCCA, Senior Judge Brubaker finds that the sexual assault and sexual contact convictions are factually insufficient, and the court sets aside those findings of guilty. The court affirms the fraternization convictions and remands the case for a sentence rehearing.

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CAAF decided the interlocutory Army case of United States v. Schloff, __ M.J. __, No. 15-0294/AR (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.), on Thursday, July 16, 2015. A divided court concludes that sexual contact, as defined by Article 120(g)(2) (2012), includes both body-to-body contact and object-to-body contact. CAAF affirms the decision of the Army CCA that reversed the contrary conclusion by the trial judge, and the court remands the case for further proceedings.

Judge Ohlson writes for the court, joined by Chief Judge Baker and Judge Ryan. Judge Stucky dissents, joined by Judge Erdmann.

The appellant is a physicians assistant who was charged with five specifications of abusive sexual contact in violation of Article 120(d) (2012). All five specifications alleged that the appellant committed sexual contact by touching an individual patient’s breasts with a stethoscope. Each specification involved a separate alleged victim. Three specifications were referred to trial, and Appellant was convicted of one.

At trial, the appellant asserted that the specifications failed to state an offense because touching with a stethoscope does not constitute sexual contact. The judge deferred ruling on the issue until after the members found the appellant guilty of one specification and sentenced him to a dismissal. The judge then set aside the findings and sentence and dismissed the specification for failure to state an offense. The Government appealed and the Army CCA reversed the trial judge. CAAF then grated review of a single issue:

Whether the Army court erred in expanding the definition of a “sexual contact” to a touch accomplished by an object contrary to the plain language of Article 120(g)(2).

In today’s 3-2 opinion, CAAF narrowly concludes that the Army court did not err, that there is no ambiguity in the statutory definition of sexual contact, and that the definition includes “those instances where an accused touches a victim with an object.” Slip op. at 3.

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In a public notice published in the Federal Register today and available here, the JSC announces an amendment to Military Rule of Evidence 803(10) by operation of law:

On December 1, 2013, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(10) was amended to add a notification requirement prior to the offering of a certification proving the absence of a public record. Inaccordance with Military Rule of Evidence 1102(a), unless action to the contrary is taken by the President, amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence amend parallel provisions of the Military Rules of Evidence by operation of law 18 months after the effective date of such amendments. Therefore, on June 1, 2015, since no action to the contrary was taken by the President, Military Rule of Evidence 803(10) was amended by operation of law.

M.R.E. 803(10) is an exception to the hearsay rule for testimony or a certification about the absence of a public record. The amendment adds a new subparagraph (B) to the Rule that requires that the Government give the defense notice of intent to offer such evidence:

(10) Absence of a Public Record. Testimony—or a certification under Rule 902—that a diligent search failed to disclose a public record or statement if:

(A) The testimony or certification is admitted to prove that

(i) the record or statement does not exist; or

(ii) a matter did not occur or exist, if a public office regularly kept a record or statement for a matter of that kind; and

(B) in a criminal case, a prosecutor who intends to offer a certification provides written notice of that intent at least 14 days before trial, and the defendant does not object in writing within 7 days of receiving the notice—unless the court sets a different time for the notice or the objection.

Discussion of the change to the federal rule is available at the Federal Evidence Review blog, here.

CAAF decided the Air Force case of United States v. Plant, __ M.J. __, No. 15-0011/AF (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.), on Wednesday, July 15, 2015. Taking a narrow view of the facts of the case based on the wording of the specification and the findings at trial, a divided CAAF finds that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the appellant’s conviction for child endangerment. The court reverses the conviction and the decision of the Air Force CCA, remanding for further action on the sentence.

Judge Ohlson writes for the court, joined by Judges Erdmann and Stucky. Judge Ryan dissents, joined by Chief Judge Baker.

CAAF granted review of a single issue:

Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding of guilty to Charge V and its specification (child endangerment) because the evidence failed to prove Appellant’s alcohol use alone amounted to culpable negligence that endangered the welfare of L.P.

The appellant was convicted contrary to his pleas of not guilty, by a general court-martial composed of members with enlisted representation, of rape, aggravated sexual assault of a child over 12 but under 16, adultery, and child endangerment, in violation of Articles 120 and 134. He was sentenced to confinement for 12 years, reduction to E-1, and a dishonorable discharge.

The conviction of child endangerment is largely unrelated to the other offenses. During a party at his house, the appellant became intoxicated. At the time, the appellant’s infant son was sleeping in the house and did not awaken during the night. The other offenses occurred during the party but did not otherwise involve or implicate the child.

The appellant was charged with child endangerment in violation of Article 134 with the following specification:

Within the State of Arkansas, between on or about 9 April 2011 and on or about 9 May 2011, [Appellant] had a duty for the care of L.E.P., a child under the age of 16 years, and did endanger the welfare of said L.E.P., by using alcohol and cocaine, and that such conduct constituted culpable negligence, and that under the circumstances, the conduct was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Slip op. at 4. The members convicted the appellant of this specification, however they excepted the words “and cocaine,” acquitting the appellant of that allegation. This finding significantly limits that majority’s review of the sufficiency of the evidence, with Judge Ohlson explaining that:

Thus, because of the manner in which the Government charged the offense, and because of the panel’s verdict in regard to the specification, the child endangerment conviction was based solely on Appellant’s use of alcohol at the time he had a duty to care for his son. Accordingly, we may not examine whether Appellant endangered LP by allegedly using cocaine during the party, by inviting virtual strangers into his home while his young son was present, or by sexually assaulting two young women in the same residence in which his son slept.

Slip op. at 4-5 (citations omitted). It is this limitation that divides the court.

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On Monday CAAF granted review – but ordered no additional briefing – in the following case:

No. 15-0664/AF. U.S. v. Sean J. Chero. CCA 38470. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE CONCLUDED APPELLANT’S MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT WAS 30 YEARS CONFINEMENT, TOTAL FORFEITURES AND A DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE.

No briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

The offense at issue is sexual assault in violation of Article 120(b)(2) (2012). The appellant was convicted contrary to his pleas of not guilty, by a general court-martial composed of officer members, and was sentenced to confinement for three years, total forfeitures, reduction to E-1, a reprimand, and a dishonorable discharge. The Air Force CCA affirmed the conviction in an unpublished decision available here.

The maximum authorized punishments under Article 120 are an issue because after Congress amended Article 120 effective June 28, 2012, President Obama failed to prescribe maximum punishments (pursuant to Article 56) for the new offenses until May 15, 2013 (notably, to this day, he has still failed to prescribe model specifications). That failure prompted one military judge to rule that the maximum authorized punishment for a violation of Article 120(b) was the jurisdictional limit of a summary court-martial (rank-dependent but a maximum of confinement for 1 month, forfeiture of 2/3 pay per month for 1 month, and reduction to E-1). The Government appealed that decision and the NMCCA reversed in United States v. Commander Booker, Military Judge, 72 M.J. 787 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2013) (discussed here), holding that by applying the sentence-determination provisions of R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(B), the authorized punishment included a dishonorable discharge and confinement for at least 30 years. CAAF then denied review without prejudice to the right to raise the issue during normal appellate review (and then the accused pleaded guilty and apparently did not raise the issue again).

In Chero, the Air Force CCA adopted the NMCCA’s analysis from Booker:

Our colleagues in a sister-service court analyzed this same issue of the maximum imposable sentence for an offense that occurred after the enactment of the current Article 120, UCMJ, but before the publication of the President’s Executive Order establishing the maximum sentence for a sexual assault against an individual who was asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware. United States v. Booker, 72 M.J. 787 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2013), appeal denied sub nom United States v. Schaleger, 73 M.J. 92 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (summary disposition). That court concluded that the maximum authorized punishment included 30 years confinement and a dishonorable discharge. Id. at 807. We find their reasoning highly persuasive and concur with both our Navy-Marine Corps Court colleagues and the trial judge.

United States v. Chero, No. 38470, slip op. at 7 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2015).

The Joint Travel Regulations (JTR) (formerly the JFTR) (available here) authorize reimbursement for travel performed on behalf of the Government, including travel to testify at a court-martial. See JTR, Appendix E1. Such reimbursement may include travel by an escort or attendant who accompanies the primary traveler when the traveler is, generally, “incapable of traveling alone.” JTR ¶ 7170 A.1.

But the Department of Defense recently expanded the circumstances where an escort or attendant is authorized to include any travel performed by:

a sexual assault victim who must travel to testify or participate (e.g., as a witness at a court martial or Article 32 hearing, pre-trial interviews, other hearing or panel (including Congressional)) in connection with the sexual assault.

The policy memorandum is available here.

I think the necessity and wisdom of this policy is dubious. My read of the pre-existing policy is that it allowed an authorizing official to determine that the traveler (including an alleged victim) cannot travel alone, and then authorize an escort or attendant. But the new policy singles out a sexual assault victim (without defining the term) for special treatment, and it does so in an incredibly broad range of circumstances.

So, for example, a person who alleges that a service member slapped their buttocks with the intent to humiliate them (a sexual contact as defined by Article 120(g)(2)(A)) “is authorized an escort or attendant” under the new policy without a showing of need. In contrast, a person who is the victim of an attempted murder by a service member, or the surviving family members of a murder victim’s family, must demonstrate need to justify not traveling alone.

There is a growing chorus of voices describing the military sexual assault response system as a victim-producing industry. I think this new policy lends support to those claims. For that reason, I think the new policy unwise.

Last week CAAF granted review of the following issue in an Army case:

No. 15-0476/AR. U.S. v. Eric L. Rapert. CCA 20130309.  On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHETHER THE FINDING OF GUILTY FOR CHARGE I AND ITS SPECIFICATION FOR COMMUNICATING A THREAT IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE THE COMMENTS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE A THREAT UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN LIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN ELONIS v. UNITED STATES, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).

Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

In Elonis (link to slip op.), the Supreme Court reversed a civilian defendant’s conviction of four counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which criminalizes using “any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.” At trial, Elonis asked for a jury instruction that would have required the Government to prove that he intended to communicate a true threat. The judge refused to give that instruction, and instead instructed the jury that the Government need only prove that a reasonable person would have foreseen that the statements would be interpreted as a threat. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Writing for the Court and reversing the Third Circuit, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that:

The jury was instructed that the Government need prove only that a reasonable person would regard Elonis’s communications as threats, and that was error. Federal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state.

Slip op. at 16.

I can’t find an opinion in Rapert on the Army CCA’s website, so I assume that the court summarily affirmed the conviction. But communicating a threat is an Article 134 offense, meaning that the basis for criminal liability is not that a threat was communicated, but rather that the circumstances were prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting. See MCM, Part IV, ¶ 110. For Rapert, a footnote in a recent CAAF opinion looms large:

From start to finish, the contested issue in the case was whether Appellant’s conduct met the terminal element of Article 134, UCMJ. Appellant argued that his conduct was insufficient to meet the terminal element, in part, because, in his view, his conduct would be constitutionally protected in a non-military setting. The trier of fact disagreed, and the ACCA concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient. What amounts to an argument that the Government has not put forth legally sufficient evidence to support an Article 134, UCMJ, conviction is fundamentally different from a constitutional argument that, in the military context, Appellant’s conduct is protected.

United States v. Goings, 72 M.J. 202, 205 n.3 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (CAAFlog case page).

This week at SCOTUS: The cert petition in Buford was added to the September 28 conference. I’m not aware of any other military justice developments at the Supreme Court, where I’m tracking one case:

This week at CAAF: The first oral argument date for CAAF’s September 2015 Term is October 6, 2015.

This week at the ACCA: The Army CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

This week at the AFCCA: The Air Force CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.

This week at the CGCCA: The Coast Guard Trial Docket shows no scheduled oral arguments at the Coast Guard CCA.

This week at the NMCCA: The Navy-Marine Corps CCA’s website shows no scheduled oral arguments.