NMCCA dismisses a conviction for consensual homosexual sodomy in United States v. Stratton.  It’s unpublished but worth the read.

Appellant was accused of forcible sodomy, but was convicted of consensual sodomy.  That means Lawrence and Marcum had to be discussed.  Read this case for the following:

• A discussion and reiteration of a “private” location is . . .  The discussion may be fruitful beyond an Article 125 case.
• A discussion of and that “the military judge’s ruling that the general disruption to the unit [of the investigation of the charges] implicated the third Marcum prong is untenable (emphasis added).
•   When a TC proffers something to the court, double-tap that for accuracy, and vice-versa.
• Broad talismanic incantations are as unhelpful in analyzing Marcum factors as they are in Mil. R. Evid. 404(b), situations.
• The court avoided the issue of whether Marcum “effectively incorporated new elements into the Article 125, UCMJ, charge and that these new elements should have been properly plead and submitted to the trier of fact. Essentially, the appellant argues that the Marcum factors are questions of fact to be answered by the trier of fact.”  Slip op. at  5, 6 n.1.
• The court avoided the issue:

  I.   POST-LAWRENCE, SODOMY IS NOT A CRIME UNLESS THERE ARE ADDITIONAL CRIMINAL ELEMENTS THAT FURTHER A LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST.  OVER DEFENSE OBJECTION, THE MILITARY JUDGE INSTRUCTED THE MEMBERS THAT SODOMY WAS A LESSER INCLDUED OFFENSE OF THE CHARGED CRIME OF FORCIBLE SODOMY.  THE MEMBERS THEN RETURNED A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY TO FORCIBLE SODOMY, BUT GUILTY TO SODOMY.  THE THEORY OF PROSECUTION FOR SODOMY WAS BASED ON ADDITIONAL FACTS ALLEGED BY THE GOVERNMENT AFTER THE TRIAL BEGAN.  THESE FACTS WERE: (1) NOT ELEMENTS DEFINED BY CONGRESS UNDER ARTICLE 125, UCMJ, (2) NOT ALLEGED ON THE CHARGE SHEET; AND (3) NOT SUBMITTED TO THE MEMBERS AND PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.  IS APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR CONSENSUAL SODOMY UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN LIGHT OF THESE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS?

Volume 208 of the Military Law Review is now available here, and it looks like a good one.  It includes two articles and two book reviews (one by CAAFlog favorite Army JAG Corps Regimental Historian Fred L. Borch III).  The two articles are MAJ Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice:  The Suspended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and TBI and Reduce Recidivism, 208 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (a 212-page article!), and COL George R. Smawley, In Pursuit of Justice, A Life of Law and Public Service:  United States District Court Judge and Brigadier General (Retired) Wayne E. Alley (U.S. Army, 1952-1954, 1959-1981), 208 Mil. L. Rev. 213 (2011).

FORT HOOD, Texas — At the request of prosecutors and defense counsel for Maj. Nidal M. Hasan, a half-day administrative hearing will begin at 10 a.m. Feb. 2 in the Lawrence J. Williams Judicial Center.

Both parties in the case of the United States vs. Maj. Nidal M. Hasan will go on the record in open court before Military Judge Col. Gregory Gross to litigate pending motions brought by defense.  The newest motions concern discovery and a continuance.  Other motions may also be filed by either side for litigation at this hearing, and the military judge may also put other matters on the record at the hearing. 

The accused is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.

Media who plan to cover the hearing must register here.

On the date for the event, satellite trucks should report to the Fort Hood Clarke Road Gate on West Highway 190 at 6 a.m. Truck registration ends at 6:45 a.m. All others should check in to the Fort Hood visitor’s center from 8-9 a.m. for final registration. All media should be prepared to show a U.S. driver’s license with photo and an accredited press badge with photo.  

The annual Art. 146, UCMJ Code Committee public meeting will be held Mar. 6, 2012 at 10:00 am at the CAAF Courtroom, see announcement here.

Hereis a story from Jacksonville, NC.  Apparently a V-22 squadron operations officer, Maj. Danny Cohlmeyer, down in New River is accused of doing naked fly-bys of local females.  He’s charged in both local court nad a GCM scheduled to start next week. According to the Ft. Campbell docket, here, the trial starts Feb. 6 in front of an all officer panel, preceded by an Art. 39(a) session on Feb. 3rd. 

An Air Force Art. 32 hearing is deciding the fate of a cadet charged with rape on USAFA gorunds.  The Colorado Springs Gazette reports, here:

Thomas, Colangelo, Claxton and several other cadets were drinking and partying in Colorado Springs when Thomas said he noticed a woman, a former cadet, was extremely drunk.

None of the cadets knew where she lived, so they brought her back to the dorms, Thomas said. After placing her on a bed, Thomas said he and other cadets left the room.

A few minutes later, Colangelo said he asked Thomas why the door was locked.

Colangelo testified to Lt. Col. Rhonda Bershok — who presided over the hearing — that he and Cadet David Burns banged on the door.

Colangelo said when Claxton opened the door, he and his friends found the woman with her pants unzipped and her shirt pulled up.

Moments later, Claxton punched Burns in the face, yelling “I’m not a rapist. I’m not a rapist,” Thomas said.

The cadets reported the incident to their superiors that night.

The SGT Brent Burke court-martial in the killing of his wife and mother-in-law is scheduled to start next month.  Coverage here from the Bowling Green Daily News.  Our prior coverage of the facts and two prior civilian trials is here and here.

Seems like this is the new frontier of MEJA, catching child pornography viewers/distributors working for the USG overseas.  Here is the DOJ press release, a couple weeks dated, found it as we were researching our amici brief and forgot to post it until an email from a friend of CAAFlog reminded me.  Have we seen the end of MEJA?  This offense occurred in 2007.

There is an interesting exchange going on between, among others, Laura Pitter (HRW), Steve Vladek, Ben Wittes and our own Cully Stimson about the fairness of the current military commissions system at Gitmo, in particular the al-Nashiri trial. Here is the latest from Vladek at Lawfare.  Here is Cully’s post on the Heritage blog comparing commissions and courts-martial.  And, in reverse order, here is Laura Pitter’s original Salon.com post that started the exchange, titled “Guantanamo’s system of injustice.”  Interesting debate.

Here is a link to the letter from the Georgia Secretary of State to the CINC’s campaign attorney.   The attorney for the Obama campaign, Michael Jablonski, has apaprently withdrawn from the proceedings after sending the CINC’s birth certificate to Mr. Kemp, but Mr. Kemp is pushing forward with Ga.’s hearing on the CINC’s ability to be on the Ga. ballot.  The AJC reports on the hearing, here:

After hearing evidence with neither President Barack Obama nor his lawyers in attendance, a state administrative law judge on Thursday did not issue a ruling as to whether Obama can be allowed on the state ballot in November.

Lawyers for area residents mounting “birther” challenges told Deputy Chief Judge Michael Malihi that Obama should be found in contempt of court for not appearing when under subpoena to do so. But Malihi did not indicate he would recommend that and cut off one lawyer when he criticized Obama for not attending the hearing.

“It shows not just a contempt for this court, but contempt for the judicial branch,” lawyer Van Irion told Malihi.

And now, to wrap things up, the “Orly Taitz Delusional Quote of the Day” courtesy of the Orange County Weekly, here, “ Does this look like a behavior of an innocent person? An innocent person would have come to court and showed all the valid documents with the embossed seals, which are verifiable. Instead he is acting like a 5-year-old brat, saying ‘I am afraid of Orly, ‘I want the secretary of state of GA to act like my mommy and protect me from Orly.’ Some leader of a free world . . .”   Let’s see, SEAL Team 6 or GA SOS, I think the CINC’s picked the right protectors of the free world.  There is no such thing as too much birthers.

The birfers strike again, see Atlanta Ledger-Enquirer story here.  If you don’t already know:

A Georgia judge has ordered President Barack Obama to appear in court in Atlanta Thursday for a hearing on a complaint that says Obama isn’t a natural-born citizen and can’t be president.

Orly Taitz, the California attorney who brought the legal challenge to Obama’s name on the March Georgia presidential primary ballot, says this is what she has been working for over the last three years.

“This will be 100 times bigger than Watergate,” she said Saturday morning, referring to the scandal that brought down President Richard Nixon in 1974.

“There are high ranking judges and federal officials who are involved in this cover up. The ramifications of this trial will be enormous.”

. . . .

A Georgia resident made the complaint, which is intended to keep Obama’s name off the state’s ballot in the March presidential primary.

And much hilarity ensued.  UPI (here) and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (here), by the way, say  that the President’s camp informed them that the CINC is unlikely to appear on Thursday.

From CNN, here:

A U.S. military judge sentenced a Marine squad leader charged with alleged war crimes in Iraq to a maximum of 90 days in prison and a reduction in pay and rank.

But because of a plea deal with prosecutors, Staff Sgt. Frank G. Wuterich won’t serve any time in the brig. The military judge was obligated to abide by the plea arrangement between prosecutors and the defense.

In the end, Wuterich’s sentence amounts to a reduction in rank — to private — and a pay cut.

So ends the Haditha cases . . . or at least until a creative Appellate Defense counsel gets a hold of the plea record in the next decade or so.   I would imagine the next step is some sort of mandatory high year tenure separation proceeding stripping SSgt (Pvt) Wuterich of benefits.

UPDATED:  A couple of additional reactions from the US’s rule of law protege countries, here.

CAAF has issued its opinion in United States v. Morrisette.

1.  WHETHER APPELLANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION WAS VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS PROSECUTED FOR OFFENSES ABOUT WHICH HE HAD PROVIDED IMMUNIZED STATEMENTS.

2.  FOSLER.

Baker writing for a unanimous court finds:

1.  No abuse of discretion as to use of allegedly immunized statements.

We now affirm.  Appellant has not demonstrated that the military judge’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous or that he misapprehended or misapplied the law.  To the contrary, the military judge’s ruling is comprehensive and well reasoned.  The law in this area is settled and sound.  Applying the England factors, we conclude that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that the Government has demonstrated that it did not make direct use of Appellant’s testimony.  While some of the England [United States v. England, 33 M.J. 37, 38-39 (C.M.A. 1991)] factors cut in favor of Appellant, the ultimate question presented in this case is not whether the Government followed best practices (it did not) or whether the decision to prosecute occurred prior to the immunized testimony (it did not), but whether the Government made direct use of the content of Appellant’s immunized statements.  The Government has met its burden in this regard.  Further, although presenting a closer question, the military judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that the Government demonstrated that it did not make indirect use of Appellant’s immunized testimony.

2.  Remanded for additional review in light of Fosler.

Three quick thoughts:

Appellant’s case was subsequently transferred to a new command, prosecution, and investigative team; however, not all of the cautions set forth in Kastigar were followed. 

And so the prosecution nearly lost a case through failure to exercise care.

A caution for defense counsel about trusting the government when the government seeks to immunize and use the client before his own trial is complete.

And the “preponderance” of evidence standard is too lenient in favor of the prosecution in this critical area of compelled self-incrimination.  Why not HBRD?

Here is a link to yesterday’s Federal Register notice on the Proposed CAAF Rules changes.  The proposal includes a relaxed filing requirement for student amici briefs and extension of the certificate of review filing deadline to 60 days to match the petition for review deadline.

Wuterich guilty plea to negligent dereliction of duty here.

H/t GGH

SCOTUS decided United States v. Jones today.  This is the GPS placed on the car case.  I had a GPS device case some years ago, so it could happen in a court-martial case.

Scalia writing for the court begins.

We decide whether the attachment of a Global Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

– It is as covered search the court concludes.  The holding is limited to placement of a device on the car.  The ruling does not address other tracking methods, such as through cell-phone technology.

Sotomayor writes in concurrence; while Alito writes for himself and Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, concurring in the judgment.

Read the opinion, especially the concurrences carefully.  Part of the result here depends how you view the facts and also that the government never raised a theory of admissibility that perhaps might have caught a dissent.

Here is a link to the Orin Kerr article referenced.

The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution

Orin S. Kerr, George Washington University – Law School
Michigan Law Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:
This article argues that courts should approach the Fourth Amendment with caution when technology is in flux. When a technology is new or developing rapidly, courts should adopt modest formulations of Fourth Amendment protections that recognize the effectiveness and institutional advantages of statutory privacy protections.
The cautious approach is justified on three grounds. First, caution is consistent with existing judicial practice. The reasonable expectation of privacy test generally has been used by the courts as a term of art that remains closely tied to property law concepts. When a technology implicates privacy but not property, current judicial practice tends to avoid broad interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.
Second, legislative privacy protections are significantly stronger than most commentators appreciate. The case of wiretapping is instructive. While Fourth Amendment scholars often view wiretapping as a constitutional field under Katz v. United States and Berger v. New York, wiretapping has long been a primarily statutory field. Even today, wiretapping practice is governed by statutory commands, not constitutional ones. More broadly, Congress has created a wide range of statutory privacy laws that protect privacy in developing technologies where the courts have declined to offer protection.
Third, legislatures have considerable institutional advantages that enable the legislative privacy rules regulating new technologies to be more balanced, comprehensive, and effective than judicially created rules. Rapid technological change makes it difficult for courts to clarify the law. Courts also lack the institutional capacity to readily appreciate existing technology and the impact of different legal rules. In contrast, courts are well equipped to respond to technological change in the context of criminal procedure rules.

Interesting summary dispo from CAAF:

U.S. v. Miranda . . . we note that the convening authority approved the sentence, which included a bad-conduct discharge, and then stated, “In accordance with the UCMJ, Rules for Courts-Martial, applicable regulations, and this action, the sentence is ordered executed.” Under Article 71(c)(1), UCMJ, a punitive discharge cannot be ordered executed until, after the completion of direct appellate review, there is a final judgment as to the legality of the proceedings. Thus, to the extent that the convening authority’s action purported to execute the bad-conduct discharge, it was a nullity. To avoid any error in this regard, we again suggest that the model “Forms for Action” in Manual for Courts-Martial, United States app. 16 at A16-1 – A16-6 (2008 ed.) be revised. See United States v. Politte, 63 M.J. 24, 26 n.11 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

We’ve discussed this before here.  CAAF can’t let go of this.  Maybe the Code Committee has a little work?